April 1970

EDITORIAL REPRINT from IRWIN EDMAN
Friendship, Solitude, and Contemplation

N. A. NIKAM
Philosophy of Indian Culture
A Metaphysic of the Idea of History: I

G. SRINIVASAN
Person and Value

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE
T. S. Eliot and Children

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THE ARYAN PATH
VOLUME XLI - NO. 4

Point out the 'Way'
—however dimly and lost among the host—
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

— The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XLI APRIL 1970 No. 4

IRWIN EDMAN

Friendship, Solitude, and Contemplation

[We reprint the following article from THE ARYAN PATH, June 1937. The original introductory note in that issue read as follows:

"The practical idealism of Professor Irwin Edman of Columbia University is well known to readers of THE ARYAN PATH. Analysing in this essay one of the apparent paradoxes in which the spiritual life abounds, he brings out the great truth that the Mystic Way, East or West, is solitary only in seeming. Beside us walk for long, unseen, unrecognized, our fellow pilgrims on the quest, but the mystic realization, intensely individual as it is in essence, is indeed shared by all who rise to it, as Professor Edman so well shows. And there is no tie in the universe equal to that which binds together comrades who, single-hearted and of royal Faith, hold Truth to be dearer than all material life and seek it on the hidden way.

As Professor Edman's great compatriot Emerson phrased it:

> Who hears me, who understands me, becomes mine, a possession for all time ... We see the noble afar off, and they repel us; why should we intrude? Late — very late —we perceive that no arrangements, no introductions, no consuetudes, or habits of society, would be of any avail to establish us in such relations with them as we desire, — but solely the uprise of nature in us to the same degree it is in them: then shall we meet as water with water: and if we should not meet them then, we shall not want them, for we are already they ... We may congratulate ourselves that the period of nonage, of follies, of blunders and of shame, is passed in solitude and when we are finished men, we shall grasp heroic hands in heroic hands."

—ED.]

THERE IS, in both the Eastern and Western traditions of mysticism and the spiritual life, a curious duality in the mode of picturing it, and indeed an ambiguity in the ideal involved. We are told, on the one hand, that contemplation is a soliloquy, and that the highest and most complete rapture consists, in the famous words of Plotinus, in being alone with the Alone. Yet we are told, sometimes in almost the same breath,

that those who participate in the Spirit are sharers in a common being and a single life of which their own contemplations are simply pulse-beats or incarnations. Each man, as Paul puts it, is the temple of God, and the Church is the ideal community of those in whom the spirit dwelleth. The mystic has his intensest moments in solitude, but in that solitude he is a friend of God, and a friend of all those who in the same way are God's friends. The contemplative is a solitary, but there is a communion of saints.

It seems to me something more than an accident that these two poles of spirituality should be stressed by the great mystics, and that between these two values of soliloquy and society should be the emphasis on the quality of friendship. The mystic stands alone, but he is, he feels, a member of a great community and that community is made not by laws or institutions but is the discarnate union of friends who meet in the common silence of their identical vision. What is there about the experience of the mystic that finds theoretic expression in terms at once so communal and so atomic, so full at once of comradeship and loneliness?

The reasons why the great mystics and contemplatives have stressed the individuality and separation involved in their ultimate vision have been repeatedly made clear. The soul, according to all the classic mystics, is finding its way home. It is going on a journey, which is a return to its homeland; it is finding its way back to its own essential being, which is the Being that animates all things. That return involves discipline, through an escape from distraction, and separation from all that manifold of things and persons which are the source of distraction. It means a farewell to the world, to the senses, to all objects of earthly love, all companions, and all outward felicities. The soul must retire into itself, into the guarded and peaceful tower of its own private mind. When it has thus retreated from externality, it begins to see. All else and all others must fade into nothingness before it can behold the ultimate brightness which all else and all others obscure. The journey is thus in its essence a solitary one and its goal is solitude. The Upward Path is a flight from the company of persons and things, beyond society into the intimacy of intense contemplation, beyond speech which is for communication into that silence which is self-communion. When the contemplative spirit has arrived at its goal, it has no friends, for it has long left them behind; it needs no friends because it is self-sufficient; its fullness is in its enraptured indistinction with Pure Being. It has forsaken everything and all to find fulfilment by itself in the One, in Brahman, in the Absolute. What use could he have for companions by the way who has finally come home, and whose heart is filled? What need

could he have for speech to whom asking is no longer relevant and for whom all answers are summed up in beatitude? For at the mystical goal, loneliness has been transfigured into a universal joy. Where there is no longer anything else in the universe save Being become a flame of awareness in the being of the mystic himself, there can be no desire for the sharing of a joy, nor anyone to share it with, nor anything to be shared. Plotinus meant what he said when he spoke of being alone with the Alone, and other mystics, whatever their language, have meant what Plotinus means.

But logically and psychologically and morally, long before the completion of the mystic's pilgrimage, his path is that of the solitary. Asceticism, on which the discipline of contemplation depends (Socrates defined philosophy as the practice of death), is not a social virtue, and thinking itself is a soliloquist's employment. The mystic and the man of affairs and social passions cannot, to use a phrase William James uses in another connection, keep house in the same tenement of clay. St. John ascends Mount Carmel in spirit, and Thoreau in fact seeks Walden Pond. Nearly all mystics have prescribed a clarification of mind (St. Bonaventura was very insistent upon it) as the indispensable preliminary to the Beatific Vision. Thinking is individualistic and idiosyncratic; it is by its very nature a break with social norms and moral conventions. It is "a mind forever voyaging through strange seas of thought alone." Even the noblest group is, by virtue of being a group, the enemy of its freest spirits. Thought, like ecstasy, is self-communion; if a dialogue, an internal dialogue of the soul with itself — questions the solitary mind puts to itelf and answers in unbefriended silence. Escape from the world is not the only motive that has prompted thinkers as well as ecstatics to flee to sanctuaries. The peace of a cloister or its equivalent is the condition of that transparency of thought which is a prelude to the intuition, rapturous and liberated, which is the mystic's goal.

All these observations must strike a familiar chord in those at all acquainted with the literature of mysticism or with any phase of the experience itself. Yet such a reader must recall how, having arrived at his goal, or even on the way to it, the mystic finds he has escaped beyond conventional society and material constraints to a companionship no less a society for being spiritual in its essence and discarnate in its structure. Thought initiates the thinker into a community more durable than those of earthly societies, less precarious because its very existence is independent of time, eternal because its foundations are in eternity. The thinker coming upon thoughts that seem most intimately his own, if they have for him the inexpugnable quality of truth, finds that they are

truths familiar to other minds. In these minds which discover the truths identical to those he has divined, the thinker recognizes his familiars; their thoughts are his, his theirs, and the thoughts of all of them a society of common themes, a commonwealth of truth. Thinkers sharing the same truth are by virtue of that sharing a community, and the thoughts shared constitute a timeless society of essential being. There is a community of thinkers, whatever their age or place or station, and a commonwealth of thoughts, whatever be their state of embodiment or aspiration.

At the end of the journey, too, when the mystic feels he has entered alone into the most private of mysteries, he makes the discovery that he has friends in his solitude and companions in his silence. All those who have followed the same path to the same end are his intimates. Sometimes he calls it the communion of saints, sometimes "ideal society," sometimes, as in Plotinus, a "choral dance" of all those who sing the same celestial music or whose spirit dances to the same universal measure, or whose being is transfigured by the same light. He is not alone with the Alone, but united in blessed identity with all those others who are none other than that Being with which he himself has become one. For mysticism leads not to union simply with a cold, abstract Absolute, but to a warm sense of community with all lovers and discoverers of the Good. It has been said that the mystic has no birthday and no native land. But he has fellow citizens in eternity and he is bound by deep ties with all those who, even unknown to him, have passed through the same dark night, the same abnegations, the same purifications, moral and intellectual, and have come to behold the same Being. In beholding the One, all the beholders become one. There is an essential solidarity among mystics stronger than any formal outward association, the fraternity of a common absorption in a final good.

And again in the preliminary stages, those of thinking and analysis, the thinker is not so alone as he first imagined. The thinker, however isolated, must use the language of his group and their habits of thought, and if he has no friends or associates in physical fact, even the hermit lives in an imagined world of those who in the past or in the future will speak and understand his idiom and move in the same realm of discourse and adoration. He feels sustained in his enterprise by the sense that there are others on the same quest and others using, all unknown to him and he to them, his words, feeling his emotions, and following the movement of his own logic and his own aspiration. He has friends in the spirit and thought would be as cold as it is popularly supposed to be, if thinking were not fortified by the warm sense of fellow thinkers, dis-

tant, living, or dead, who pass through the same paradoxes and austerities and come upon the same triumphant insights.

The modern radio is a singular illustration, perhaps, for a theme that goes back almost to prehistory. But the contemplative and the mystic are like listeners in their isolation scattered over the world listening to an identical music, clear, compelling, and possessing. Each listens in his detachment, and yet all listen to the same harmony, and are made one by the same living beauty by which they are possessed. Thinking is necessarily the quiet business of solitude; ecstasy is incommunicable. But the many minds are made one by a common thought, and the remote joy of the sanctuary makes one a partner of all those who share in their isolation a similar, nay, the same joy.

However solitary, therefore, may be what St. Bonaventura called the "itinerary of the mind to God," it is an itinerary followed by many, and in following it those many are one. It is isolated only externally; in essence the mystical path is that of friends travelling together in a companionship secret even from each other. But at the end they have found not only the good they seek but each other. The journey of contemplation is in solitude but it is a movement toward Friendship and toward Love.

IRWIN EDMAN

The Divine Beauty in Nature

The divine beauty in nature's realm
Is seen in the light of Plato's sun.
The green-leaved trees and the blue of sky:
All these are reminiscent of God.

It does not appear on a sunless day.
Then we who are nature's children
Under the gray sky cherish earth itself,
Though we do not forget from whence we come.

Divine beauty is the sun's gift.
It shines for us in all nature
And beckons, calling us homeward.
To beauty's source who is our God.

MARY CARMAN ROSE

N. A. NIKAM

Philosophy of Indian Culture

A Metaphysic of the Idea of History

[Professor N. A. Nikam is one of the seniormost of teachers of philosophy in the Indian universities and has presided over the Indian Philosophical Congress. He has taught for many years in India and has been Vice-Chancellor of the University of Mysore, and has also taught as a Visiting Professor in more than one American university.

He has prepared a very substantial essay on what he calls the Metaphysic of the Idea of History as he has discovered it in Indian cultural tradition. This essay will appear in a volume to be entitled *Contemporary Indian Philosophies of History* under the editorship of Dr. Grace Edith Cairus of Florida State University, Tallahassee, and Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan of the University of Madras. We publish here the first part of this thought-provoking analysis.—ED.]

I

THIS CONCISE ESSAY has brief paragraphs only on certain significant distinctions that a philosophy of history implies in the broad field of Indian culture.

1. What is the metaphysic of the idea of history? Is the idea of history compatible with the idea of the "timeless"? In the philosophy of Indian culture, the Upaniṣads and Buddhism are both concerned, although in different senses, with the "timeless." In the Upaniṣads, the object of "higher knowledge" or *parā-vidyā* is the Imperishable *akṣara*; the *akṣara* is, in the language of the *Gītā*, both eternal, *nitya*, and changeless, *acalaḥ*; whereas, the "Point-Instant" of Buddhism, as Stcherbatsky calls it, is, in another sense, "timeless": for the "Point-Instant" has not *duration;* it perishes *as* it arises. It seems, therefore, that both what is eternal and what passes away as it arises contradict the idea of history.

If the idea of history is incompatible with what is "timeless," then it involves time; and the predicates past, present, and future involve date and duration. A metaphysic of the idea of history in the philosophy of Indian culture is therefore a metaphysic of the idea of time in the philosophy of Indian culture.

2. If a metaphysic of the idea of history involves time it also involves a "regressive" perspective of time. Indeed, what is history but a "regressive" perspective of time? In reflecting upon the nature of an endless series in *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant says that Speculative Reason has a "partiality" towards the "regressive" end of an endless

series. Why is this the case? It is the case because the "regressive" ends of an endless series *exist* "completed in their totality," says Kant, and therefore, in going to the "regressive" end of an endless series, Speculative Reason intends to discover the *necessity* of things, i.e., Speculative Reason is more interested in the question, "What are the conditions which have given rise to x?" than in the question, "What follows from the fact that there is x?"

3. Now, not only history but science is involved in a "regressive" perspective of time. Science is involved in discovering the invariable and antecedent conditions of an event that has happened; in discovering the invariable and antecedent conditions of an event that has happened, science discovers a type of necessity — the causal necessity of things — i.e., science explains the "later" event by the "earlier" event. Now, although history involves a "regressive" perspective, it is not seeking to discover the *necessity* of things; nor is "historical explanation" the same as "causal explanation." In history, Speculative Reason seems to function in a different way, viz., in discovering what was "earlier" than what was "earlier." Now, in this quest, Reason does not stop in history; it goes on; it seems as if Reason in history is in quest of "absolute beginnings" and yet accepts nothing as having an "absolute beginning." Reason in history is involved in making a movement into the past, to know what was "earlier" than what was "earlier," what was "ancient" even in "ancient" times.

4. The idea of history, then, involves the idea of time; indeed, history may be defined as a "regressive" perspective of time, and in the regressive movement into the past, reason in history seems to be involved in an apparent paradox of going to "absolute beginnings" without accepting that something has an "absolute beginning." The philosophy of Indian culture resolves this apparent paradox by its conception of time as a "cycle" or "circle" (the "Circle of Nature" as the Greeks called it), in which the "beginning" of something is conceived as the "end" of something else. In other words, the philosophy of Indian culture does not conceive time as "linear" but as "cyclical." This means that there may be co-existent cycles different from each other, and each "cycle" has its own "history": therefore, it seems that the idea of "history" involved in the philosophy of Indian culture is the idea of "histories." F. H. Bradley said: "The Absolute has no history but has histories time without number": the philosophy of Indian culture involves a view of history such that there is no "history" without "histories."

5. Time, said Plato, is the "moving image" of eternity; in the philosophy of Indian culture, time is a "moving wheel" set in motion, *Pra-*

vartitam cakram, which man must keep in motion. And, in the "moving wheel" of time, everything "renews" itself, i.e., nothing ever perishes absolutely, and nothing ever arises absolutely. And so, in the philosophy of Indian culture, death is not the "end" of life but its "renewal" and a condition of "rebirth." All "births" are therefore, it seems, only "rebirths." This is the "Circle of Nature" as the Greeks called it. This is the nature of the year *saṁvatsara* as the *Praśna Upaniṣad* says. But all cycles, according to the philosophy of Indian culture, are comprehended in the *ultimate* cycle when manifest existence returns to its unmanifest source in the Imperishable:

> The Imperishable is the real. As sparks innumerable fly upward from a blazing fire, so from the depths of the Imperishable arise all things. To the depths of the Imperishable, they in turn descend

— i.e., *all "progress" is ultimately a "Return."*

6. Now, whether the perspective of time that the idea of history involves is "linear" or "cyclical," history is a "regressive" perspective of time and a movement into the past: this is what is common to the opposite conceptions of time as "linear" and as "cyclical." Indeed, history is a *discovery* of the past, a discovery of what "was."

In its idea of history, the philosophy of Indian culture makes, implicitly, a distinction between two senses of the past tense "was": this is the most significant and the most interesting part of the idea of history in the philosophy of Indian culture. Although the distinction between the two senses of the past tense "was" is a distinction in time, yet, there is, it seems, a *temporal* and *timeless* sense of "was": e.g. (*a*) What "was" in a *temporal* sense was *not* before it "was," i.e., what "was" in a temporal sense has a "date" — Julius Caesar was *not* before he "was"; whereas, (*b*) the "timeless" sense of "was" is the notion of "what never was *not*": i.e., what "was" in a *timeless* sense has *no* "date."

Now, it seems that the movement into the past that the idea of history involves, in the philosophy of Indian culture, is a movement from what has "date" to what is "undated": what happened "once upon a time." And what happened "once upon a time" is not "ancient" merely but "contemporary."

What happened "in time" and has "date," and what happened "once upon a time" and has no "date" are both *narratives.* For instance, the *Kena Upaniṣad* narrates that "once upon a time," the Vedic gods were ignorant of *Brahman*; that "once upon a time," *Brahman* won a victory over the Vedic gods in which the gods also rejoiced; like a true victory, which history has yet to demonstrate, it was a victory for the vanquished as well as the victor.

7. In the regress to the past that the idea of history involves, there is therefore a distinction between what is "dated" and what is "undated": the "undated" involves the notion of "once upon a time"; the notion of "once upon a time" implies the notion of what "happened." Now, this is one sense of the past tense "was."

There is yet another sense of "was" which does *not* imply the notion of what "happened"; it implies the notion of what "is"; it implies the notion of Being. In other words, the notion of "was" implies the notion of "is," the notion of that which "never was not." It is this sense of "was" that is present in the Upaniṣads: *atmā va idam agra āsīt,* "the *ātman was,* (and) one only" says the Upaniṣad. In general the Upaniṣads speak of Being. The notion of Being is the notion of what "is" in a "timeless" sense. But the Upaniṣad speaks of what "is" in a timeless sense in the "timeless" sense of "was," i.e., it speaks of what "is" as "*what never was not.*" In other words, the Upaniṣad speaks of Ontology under the category of History. And the notion of what "was" in a "timeless" sense is the notion of what "was" before anything "was," i.e., it is "what never was not." In its "regressive" movement into the past, does history then merge into ontology? This is the question; and then what does having "a historical sense" mean?

8. In its idea of history, it seems therefore as if the philosophy of Indian culture passes from ontology to history, and from history to ontolgy, i.e., it speaks of what "is" in a "timeless" sense as what "was" in a "timeless" sense. For instance, the *Gītā* speaks of that which is embodied and says it is not destroyed if the body is destroyed. Why? Because, "the embodied," *dehī,* is *sanātanaḥ,* "ancient," and *purāṇaḥ,* "new even in olden times." Therefore, in a regress into a receding past, the idea of history in the philosophy of Indian culture distinguishes between (*a*) what "was" and has "date," and (*b*) what "was" and has no "date." It seems that the regressive movement in the philosophy of Indian culture in its idea of history is a movement from "history," *itihāsa,* a record of "as it thus happened" to *purāṇa,* to what *was,* "what was ancient even in ancient times," as Plato said of the myth. There is no understanding of a cultural tradition without an understanding of the myths of that tradition. In a regressive movement history merges into pre-history and pre-history merges into the myth, and the myth narrates what *was*—what was ancient even in ancient times.

9. There is yet another sense of "was" involved in the idea of history, i.e., the "was" as "recollection." The Upaniṣad says, "In space one is born, and unto space one is born," *ākāśe jāyate, ākāśam abhijāyate* (*Chāndogya,* VII.12.1). The idea of history involves space and time; both

signify what the Upaniṣad calls "unlimited freedom." The regress into the past that the idea of history involves is regress of one sort of "unlimited freedom," i.e., the "earlier" you go, the "earlier" you can go. If, in our perception of the external world, space and time are, according to Kant, two formal conditions of sense-perception or "two forms of sense-perception," space and time are the two "unlimited freedoms" of history. And, just as perception of the external world is possible on the one, Kantian condition that space and time are forms of perception, regress into the "unlimited freedom" of history is possible because there is something "greater than," as the Upaniṣad puts it, greater than the "unlimited freedom" of space and time that the idea of history implies, and this comprehends the "unlimited freedom" of space and time. What is this? This is memory or recollection: *smaro vāva ākāśād bhūyaḥ*: "Memory, verily, is greater than space (and time)." If there were no memory or recollection, there would be no historical knowledge, and historical knowledge is a form of self-knowledge: for if the doctrine of "Transcendental Recollection," *pratyabhijñā*, is true, then, "Know Thyself" means "Recollect Thyself."

10. Now, the regress into the past that the idea of history involves is primarily a regress into that which "was" (whether in a temporal or a timeless sense). But the "was" ought to be qualified significantly into what "was done." For history is a recollection of what "was done." It is a recollection of deeds done (or of deeds not done). Therefore, it is relevant for the Upaniṣad to say: "O Mind, remember, remember, what has been done. Remember, what has been done" (*Aum Krato smara, Kṛtam smara, Krato smara, Kṛtam smara*). The Upaniṣad repeats the word "Remember." Since the Law of Karma is one of the great ideas of the philosophy of Indian culture, it is relevant for the philosophy of Indian culture to lay emphasis on its conception of recollection of the past, recollection of deeds done in the past. For, unlike the realm of nature in which "events" happen, history is, essentially, the realm of deeds. History is the realm of action. And history is the realm not of what "happens" but of what is "done," the realm of what man "makes."

Therefore, although we may speak, in a secondary sense of the word "history," of the history of rocks or the "natural history" of the animal species, yet, history is in a significant sense what man "makes." There is no history unless we "make" history; we "make" history only when we make a "new" history as Gandhi said, and as Asoka did in India: by changing from war to the pursuit of peace, Asoka made "new" history. And according to the philosophy of Indian culture, man "makes" history when, and only when, "he saves himself by himself and does not destroy

himself." *Uddharet ātmanā ātmānam, na ātmānam avasādayet,* as the *Gītā* says. In this sense, man is involved in "making" history.

11. At this stage, the idea of history as involving a regress into the past (whether in a temporal or timeless sense of "was"), has been superseded by the idea of history as the realm of action. And, as man acts for the future when he acts and seeks always to "make" the future different from the past, action unites past and future, i.e., it unites memory of the past with hope of the future. Therefore, history is not merely memory in the philosophy of Indian culture but something greater than memory: as greater than memory, hope is greater than the "unlimited freedom" that memory shows in its regress into a timeless past that "was." Therefore the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says, "Hope, assuredly, is greater than Memory": *āśā vāva smarād bhūyasī.* The greatness of a cultural tradition is not only that it has an undated past where history recedes into myth, but the hope that it has for its own future, which ought to be greater than its own past. "What hope does this or that tradition have for itself?" is a relevant question involved in a study of the philosophy of history in a cultural tradition that is so ancient as the Indian, which is alive today to look back upon its ancient and undated past in order to renew itself to live in the futurity of a changing world.

N. A. NIKAM

(To be concluded)

Love

Secret sorrow
Born of love,
Consuming all
The heart away.

Only love itself
Can rescue,
Banish thought of self, and bring
Sweet compassion
Into play.

Then may love
Return once more
Bringing joy
Another day.

AUDREY S. LA ROCHE

G. SRINIVASAN

Person and Value

[Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, University of Mysore, is well known to our readers by his many lucid articles on various philosophical topics. In this brief essay he examines several theories as to the source of value and proposes a reconciliation between the two extreme views which place value either wholly in the object itself or wholly in the eye of the beholder. He finds a place too for the metaphysical basis of fundamental value judgements.—ED.]

WHILE a discussion of values is purely rational, the actual valuation is always more than rational. For the affective-conative being of man plays a basic role in his valuation and anything is valued by him because it satisfies a felt need of his personality. What is thus involved in valuation is not any single aspect of personality but the personality as a whole.

Of all the living beings, only man is capable of valuation, and reason is often instrumental to his valuation. Man is thus an essentially valuational being and there can be no person without some sort of valuation or other. But the converse of this is no less true; for valuation is after all a human act and cannot take place without a person. While this may undoubtedly be asserted of valuation, the same perhaps may not be asserted of value without fear of contradiction. For whether value is independent of human existence and, if so, in what sense and to what extent is a highly controversial question. This is an axiological problem which has engaged the attention of many contemporary philosophers.

Broadly speaking, there are two opposed views on the matter. One view maintains that value inherently belongs to the thing as a quality of it and always "resides" in it irrespective of its appreciation by a person. Value is in this sense prior to a person's valuation of a thing and "exists" in it independently of his valuation. This is the objectivistic theory of value[1] supported by L. R. Ward, G. E. Moore, Ross, Urban, John Laird, and others. The other view is subjectivistic: it maintains that the value of a thing consists in the feeling of pleasure or the subjective interest which a person evinces with regard to the thing and

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[1] "Value is the character or quality of an existent on account of which character or quality the existent is or can be the end of action."—LEO RICHARD WARD: *Philosophy of Value* (London. 1930), pp. 180–1.

"Nature, indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour or sound. Why, then, should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?"—JOHN LAIRD: *A Study in Realism* (New York. 1921), p. 129

hence the "locus" of value is the subject and not the object.[2] This view is familiarly known as the interest theory of value and is supported by George Santayana, R. B. Perry, Dewitt H. Parker, and others.

Needless to say, both these views are extreme and hence defective. The objectivistic theory of value is wrong in identifying value with the quality of a thing. For many a time we find in common experience that the quality of a thing remains constant whereas its value goes on changing from person to person and from time to time. What is valuable to one person at the present time may turn out to be valueless to the same person at a different time or to a different person at the same time. This relativism and variation of value cannot be explained on the basis of the objectivistic postulate that value "exists" in the thing independently of subjective appreciation. No doubt the thing must possess certain qualities if value is to be ascribed to it and hence the quality of a thing is the *condition* of its value; but the *condition of value* is not itself the value, since the value of a thing "exists" only in relation to an appreciating consciousness or person.

The subjectivistic or interest theory of value is defective in so far as it underestimates the importance of the object in valuation. For unless an object is present with certain qualities valuation will be impossible; no doubt, the qualities of a thing do not themselves *constitute* the value of a thing but are nevertheless the conditions of value without which valuation cannot take place.

A third view which reconciles these two extreme views is the emergent theory of value.[3] According to this view, value arises out of the interplay between the subject and the object and hence neither is dispensable if value is to emerge. Being a corrective of both the views, the third reconciles their opposition. It agrees with the objectivistic view that the object with specific qualities is essential if value is to arise, but points out that it will be an untenable assumption to maintain that value inherently "resides" in the object independent of subjective appreciation. For human experience reveals that the value of a thing "exists" only in relation to an appreciating person, and in abstraction from an appreciating consciousness, value cannot be. Value is hence born in the act of valua-

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[2] "Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature."—GEORGE SANTAYANA: *The Sense of Beauty* (New York. 1899), pp. 18–19

" Values belong wholly to the inner world, to the world of mind. ... A value is always an experience, never a thing or object. Things may be valuable, but are not values."—DEWITT H. PARKER: *Human Values* (New York. 1931), pp. 20–21

" To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value."—R. B. PERRY: *The Moral Economy* (New York. 1909), p. 15

[3] For a detailed exposition of this view please see K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR: *The Metaphysics of Value* (Mysore. 1942), Vol. I, Chs. III, IV and VI

tion and is not prior to it as the objectivist holds. The emergent theory agrees with the subjectivist view that value cannot arise in the absence of an appreciating person, but points out that neither can there be value in the absence of an object capable of being appreciated by virtue of its qualities.

The chief merit of the emergent theory of value is thus its affirmation of the interrelation of a specifically qualified object and an affective-conative subject as generative of value. It liberates value from its "static imprisonment" in the inert thing and endows it with variation and dynamism depending upon the changing person who conceives it. Person and value are thus brought together on a right footing in the emergent theory of value; there can be no person without a sense of value, nor can there be a value unappreciated by a person. Each depends on the other and accounts for the dynamism of the other. Any "change" in the person would result in a change in his values and any change in his values would rightly disclose the kind of person he is tending to be.

In its co-affirmation of the subject and the object as equally essential for valuation, this theory is more true to the ontological structure of human existence than the other theories. For a structural analysis of human existence discloses it to be "unitary" and not seclusive; man ever discovers himself to be in "isolation" from things but as related to them; this relation is not mere "spatial togetherness," but a concernful mode of relation in which man has something to *do* with things; he does not merely "look at" them but reacts to them through his emotions and desires; sometimes he deals with them even more actively and manipulates or transforms them so as to satisfy certain ends of his; things thereby "acquire" value for him which they would not otherwise possess. Man is in this sense a creator of values, but he creates values out of things; things enter the process of valuation as the stuff out of which man creates values as determined by his emotions and desires.

Since man is never given in abstraction from things but always as related to them, what he evaluates at any time of his valuational life is not the thing itself (though it appears to be so) but his own specific relation with it. When a man says that he "finds" value in a particular thing, the truth of the matter is that he is finding value in the present kind of relation he has with that particular thing. The axiological implication of this is that man's specific emotions and desires, which enter into his relation with a thing, determine the value of that relation. Consequently any change in the desires and emotions of a man would effect a change in his values, and this twofold change is the valuational dynamism into which personal existence is cast. This is a uniquely personal dynam-

ism and hence distinguishes the person from other living beings. The basic condition of this dynamism is ethical freedom. For it is in freedom that man can, not only create "new" values but accept and adopt values which are passed on to him by others with a freshness and originality of his own.

The principle underlying the valuational dynamism of man is that each value satisfies a certain desire of his and after each satisfaction the desire renews itself so as to demand fresh satisfaction and thus goes on the perpetual cycle of desire and satisfaction in the field of valuation. But after several such repetitions, any desire and the accompanying emotion "perish" and in "perishing" bring about a newer desire and emotion constitutive of a higher level of human existence; man thus ascends from one level of existence to another[4] — from the biological to the ethical and social, and from the ethical and social to the spiritual and metaphysical — and simultaneously creates a gradation of values to suit the different levels of his affective-conative being. Thus, while each level of being negates itself, it also produces a higher level of being and thereby creates new corresponding values. "Creative self-negation" is thus the principle involved in the axiological dynamics of man.

This process of value-creation may, however, be regarded as having a metaphysical origin and orientation. The possibility of different value-experiences may be said to be inherently present in a Divine Reality which has evolved into self-consciousness in man. The value-experiences of each person are hence metaphysically rooted in a Divine Reality of which man is a unique embodiment. No doubt, man "creates" values in his affective-conative reaction to other persons and things, but the other persons and things are to be regarded more as "occasions" rather than as causes of his value-experiences. For the value-experiences originate in him out of a Divine source with which he bears an ontological unity; even when he reacts to other persons and things, he is only keeping himself open to the influence of the Divine through them. His basic spiritual "freedom" thus consists in the openness of being he cultivates by orienting it towards the Divine. He is to "create" values not with a sense of forlornness or isolation from the Divine, but with a sense of participation in the Divine creativity. The metaphysical theory of values thus establishes a continuum of being between the human and the Divine and thereby provides the requisite metaphysical base for their mutual co-operation and companionship in the creation of values.

G. SRINIVASAN

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[4] For an analysis of the different levels of human existence, please see my article, "The Dialectic of the Individual," THE ARYAN PATH, Vol. XL, No. 6–7 (June–July 1969), pp. 242–5

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

T. S. Eliot and Children

[Mr. Neville Braybrooke is a well-known writer who has contributed often to THE ARYAN PATH on literary themes. In this article he deals specifically with the meaning childhood had for T. S. Eliot, and has a section on the meaning of T. S. Eliot for children, documented from the replies of school children which he collected for a symposium on T. S. Eliot's seventieth birthday in 1958.—ED.]

T. S. ELIOT often showed a preoccupation with childhood and at times this preoccupation showed itself as a search for a lost Eden. In "Burnt Norton" leaves are alive with the laughter of children: "Quick, said the bird, find them, find them. ..." In "Little Gidding" there are

> the children in the apple-tree
> Not known, because not looked for
> But heard, half-heard, in the stillness
> Between two waves of the sea.

Moreover, as the waves of the sea recall the river-god from "The Dry Salvages" that "was present in the nursery," so the apple-tree, acting as a double symbol, recalls both the expulsion from the garden and the cross that, in religious terms, made redemption possible.

This theme was repeated in the plays, notably in *The Family Reunion,* where Harry speaks nostalgically of the hollow tree in which he played "Injuns" and regrets the summerhouse that has been put in its place "to please the children." For the question that confronts Harry is "Who am I?" — a question, in some form or other, that all Eliot's characters have to answer. In *The Confidential Clerk* the problem is intensified because there the question or quest of self-identification is closely allied with that of heredity and illegitimacy. In *The Cocktail Party* the problem is the same, though there the quest is concealed in the question.

The Cocktail Party had its première at the Edinburgh Festival of 1949; and when the curtain went up Lavinia and Edward Chamberlayne had been married five years. Later, when the play was transferred, the number was increased to twelve. What was the reason? I suspect that it was bound up with something that Eliot had said ten years before when he published his book on *The Idea of a Christian Society*:

> It would be more natural, as well as in better conformity with the Will of God, if there were more celibates and if those who were married had larger families.

Hence it becomes more noticeable if after twelve, rather than five, years the Chamberlaynes have no children. Again, in Martin Browne's 1950 New York and London productions, Lavinia was shown resting on a couch at the beginning of the third act; some took this to mean she was pregnant — and, since Edward's old self-centred egotism had been replaced by a remarkable attentiveness to her, they felt that this lent strength to their supposition. Characteristically, Eliot declined to comment.

In his last Ariel poem, "The Cultivation of Christmas Trees" (which came out in 1954), there is again to be seen the same marked concern with children. Yet the lack of attention that has been paid to this poem suggests that critics have either found the concern too repetitious to comment on, or else have been disconcerted by it. I believe the second of these two answers to be nearer the truth.

Another earlier Ariel poem connected with Christmas and children was "The Journey of the Magi," originally published in 1927. Its concern was with death, but death in relation to the birth of a particular child; basically its sentiments had been echoed many times before in hymns and Christmas card greetings, although the language of its poetry was such that it lifted readers into another sphere. Likewise, "The Cultivation of Christmas Trees" is a nativity poem, concerned with the birth of a child and an "awareness of death," but concerned at the same time with the problem of distinguishing between being "childish" and "becoming as a little child":

> The child wonders at the Christmas Tree:
> Let him continue in the spirit of wonder ...

The child sees the candle as a star and sees the angel with its spreading wings embracing the branches not only as a decoration "but as an angel." For the poem, first published as a greetings card to be slipped into an envelope, is an invocation that the rapture, reverence, and gaiety of the first remembered Christmas may not pall with the thirtieth or fortieth, the seventieth or eightieth (by "eightieth" meaning whichever is the last). Neither fatigue nor tedium must be allowed to creep in; neither bored habituation, nor the consciousness of failure. There is, too, an express warning against the piety of the converted

> Which may be tainted with a self-conceit
> Displeasing to God and disrespectful to the children ...

"Disrespectful" is a key word.

As there is a difference between being "childish" and "becoming as a little child," so there is a difference between "respect" and "respectabil-

ity." Respectability implies a host of minute observances — the neatly tied cravat; being at one with the Establishment; conversation restricted to What Precisely and If and Perhaps and But; and a severe adherence to a strict Sunday discipline at all times. Of this side of his nature, Eliot was always aware, having on several occasions gently mocked at his own features of "clerical cut." In fact, his friend Ezra Pound carried the joking a step further when in his *Cantos* he referred to "Old Possum" as "the Rev. Eliot." Others found in his eagle-like bearing a similarity to that of an elder statesman (the subject of his last play), whilst close friends often remarked on the striking resemblance there was between him and John Foster Dulles. Yet there remains the paradox that despite this conventional exterior he was, linguistically, a poet and dramatist who did more than any other poet or dramatist since Shakespeare's day to revolutionize the common forms of speech.

Respect informed all his best writing — whether his subject was the protection of bird sanctuaries; the preservation of London's old squares; or the correct procedure needed for ad-dressing cats. *Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats* was, for instance, "respectfully dedicated" to all those that had assisted him in its composition, and in the last piece called "The Ad-dressing of Cats" there is the wise advice to

> always keep in mind that he
> Resents familiarity

— followed by the suggestion that hats should also be raised because

> A Cat 's entitled to expect
> These evidences of respect.

Nor is it being particularly Chestertonian to submit that some of Eliot's profoundest beliefs were to be discovered in his one departure into nonsense verse, since there is a hierarchy in the animal kingdom no less binding than there is in the government of men. Remember that "A Dog 's a Dog — A CAT 'S A CAT" and that cats, unlike dogs, are one of the very few animals (as recent veterinary research has shown) that are never bored with their own company: such minds as they have (if the word be permitted) are never blank.

In 1763, Christopher Smart in his long poem, "A Song to David," writes of the cat as "an instrument for the children to learn benevolence upon." These too were Eliot's sentiments and indeed this attitude or approach came through in every line that he ever wrote. For his was a hierarchical view of society and the world, in which everyone must know their appointed place — the favourite goldfish swimming round the prickly pear or the domestic pet lying before the hearth no less than the

child or his elder. This does not bring with it an air of condescension or patronage because Eliot with the humility that marks a great poet was never afraid to listen to the voices of children — whether they came from Eden, the garden at Wishwood or Burnt Norton, or were heard in the New Hampshire orchard "Between the blossom — and the fruit-time." How, in turn, it may be asked, did the children themselves respond and with what respect?

This is not merely a rhetorical question, because it is one that I propose answering by calling upon the children themselves. When I had the idea of editing a symposium for T. S. Eliot's seventieth birthday in 1958, I had the aim of making it as comprehensive as possible; if there were to be voices from every generation, why not from the youngest of all? So I set about approaching hundreds of headmasters and headmistresses in order to gain their collaboration. I told them that if there was an eight-hundred-word restriction for their candidates, there was no restriction on theme or manner of approach. The best entries were included in my anthology.[1] However, in my comments here, I shall draw not only upon the book but also upon the experience of having read hundreds of pieces by those whose essays had to be returned simply because there was not space to print them in the limited number of pages at my disposal.

The first thing that I noticed was that the *Four Quartets* and later plays were preferred to the author's earlier poems and first attempts at poetic drama. One boy in his last term at school wrote: "I revolt from Eliot's view of society in *The Waste Land* ... love is a sexual act in which the female is indifferent, the male lustful." Or if I may paraphrase from a girl, also in her last term: "We feel sick in the Sweeney poems. The mood is sordid — 'She yawns and draws a stocking up'. The 'feels' in the earlier works are too thick, can be touched too easily." Today these are judgements that most people of the middle and older generations would probably reverse, a fact doubtless springing from the human weakness of always attaching the greatest importance to "what was contemporary when one was young oneself."

For instance, quite a number of schools have produced *Murder in the Cathedral,* but few have so far ventured as far as *The Family Reunion* or *The Confidential Clerk* — a lack of initiative lamented by several of the candidates. Once more, can this be due to the age barrier between those teaching and those taught? For those that are now teaching were

[1] Reprinted in 1969 in New York by Books for Libraries Press, and to be reprinted in London in 1970.

mostly educated themselves during the period between the two World Wars when the threat of both Nazism and Fascism lent a kind of extra colour to the struggle between Church and States as symbolized in the struggle between the archbishop and the knights; but that colour has passed, or rather darkened. The hydrogen bomb has introduced new and terrifying shadows into the possibility of any future war. " We have become ensnared with the revolving circle of ambition, power, atoms," said one contributor — and then chose an image appropriate to her sex: "We are caught up ... and whirled round as surely as if we were trapped in one of our own ... labour-saving devices, the washing machine."

Some pedants and dons might dismiss this remark as schoolgirl hyperbole. Which would, remembering the child's age of fourteen, be a little unfair. After all, hydrogen and atom bombs have given a literal meaning to the phase "being blown sky-high," which might earlier in the century have been dismissed likewise as schoolboy exaggeration. Perhaps a working knowledge of atoms and the sense of insecurity that a stock-piling of hydrogen bombs fosters is not unrelated to the present demand for space-fiction from all classes and ages. It may represent a modern form of escape no less than ghost stories did in the eighteenth century.

In the eighteenth century, which was one of rationalism, ghost stories achieved a popularity which subsequently they have never surpassed; in the twentieth century, with its accent on materialism, something similar may have happened with regard to space-fiction. And yet if this is an age of materialism (as Eliot contended in his book about a Christian society and later in his *Notes Towards a Definition of Culture*), then it is the one that is being countered, from a literary point of view, by a most notable spiritual renaissance in letters in both the East as well as the West. In that revival, Eliot was one of the most significant protagonists, although as far back as the 1920s he had always cut something of a lone figure; like Yeats and Ezra Pound, he stood aloof from those poets who grouped themselves into bands, issuing manifestos and creating "schools" of writing in which more often than not a strong party line was the principal binding thread.

It came as a shock to one girl in her middle teens to realize that *The Cocktail Party* was being acted in a modern setting in modern dress; then suddenly she understood that the characters belonged to no century, because their problems were "those which might happen at any time." Their setting was in "a kind of universal limbo" — an interpretation emphasizing how Eliot's drawing-rooms or consulting-rooms are really divine waiting-rooms of comedy in which changes are wrought in the characters that are as imperceptible as the transitions in which their

thoughts move from prose into poetry.

His language is communicated before it is understood, suggested one boy. Another wrote to say: "I was impressed by the realism in the poetry, the human touch of the gin and water episode in Act I." Then another, this time illustrating his arguments from *The Waste Land,* went on: "I liked, but did not understand, the interpolations in foreign tongues — Latin, French, Italian, German and Greek ... they added a professional touch and ... we all secretly pride ourselves on our pronunciation of foreign words '*Le Prince d'Aquitaine á la tour abolie*'. Or which is simpler: 'Shantih shantih shantih.'"

This may have something to do with "all the sound or joy of primitive creation" found by another in the lines:

Weialala leia
Wallala leialala.

Or it may have something to do with a relaxing quality, which one boy discovered whilst writing his essay in the school infirmary: "I find T. S. Eliot so completely relaxing to read, especially when worried or bothered. A poem which really does relax me is 'Animula.' It seems to unroll itself like a carpet. I can imagine myself to be there, moving among the legs of the tables and chairs." With this tribute would seem to go the inference that without becoming "childish," the poet has succeeded in "becoming as a little child," just as in his *Four Quartets* he succeeded in recalling "the laughter in the garden" no less than "The bitter apple and the bite in the apple." In short, in the image of "the children in the apple-tree," he was able to bring together Burnt Norton, Eden, Little Gidding all in one short telegraphic phrase.

During his life, Eliot was described as both a classicist and a romantic by various critics of different generations. Yet the garland that the young brought in my anthology would best be worn by a poet of love. For against the increased mechanization of the world, he made verbal the thoughts of many in his insistence that

all shall be well and
All manner of *thing* shall be well [My italics]

For in Eliot's view no *thing* was ever too small not to matter — whether it was the child's cry raised in protest against the triumphal battalions on the march; the angel spreading its wings over the Christmas tree; or the goldfish swimming round the prickly pear. No voice, cry, or protest is ever wholly lost. Sometimes when everything is black and overcast and the odds are a hundred to one, men are fond of consoling themselves with the knowledge that there is just a cat's chance that

things may grow better. As a cat is "an instrument for children to learn benevolence upon," so in turn children are instruments ... . The argument comes full cycle. For to poets, children have always served as symbols of hope, redemption, and resurrection; even before they are born they unconsciously celebrate them in their verses when they hail the future. But the state is transitional since the time arrives when the future becomes the present and "here and now cease to matter"; and at that moment the journey of the Magi ceases to be symbolic and becomes the universal experience of all men.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

The Added Dimension

The great majority of people
live in a world
which is horizontal
and on the same level
and congruent
with common sense.
We who are few
live in a world
which is horizontal
and on the same level
and congruent with common sense.
But the world in which we live
is also perpendicular
to the plane of common sense.
This added dimension, apparently,
creates difficulties.
In effect, from our height,
we behold a different world
and speak of different things
in a different language.
The attempt to understand
by those in the customary dimensions
or the belief
that there is understanding
does not achieve its intention.
There is still the need
to come up higher.

DANIEL SIMPKINS

H. G. NARAHARI

The Dravidian Family of Languages

[Dr. H. G. Narahari, M.A., M.LITT., PH.D., of the University Department of Linguistics, Deccan College, Poona, is an old friend who has written often in our journal. He offers us here a survey of the group of Indian languages that might properly be called Dravidian, with interesting details of its sub-groupings and the process of linguistic discovery which has established the classification.—ED.]

OVER HALF-A-DOZEN GREAT FAMILIES OF LANGUAGES are ascertained[1] by historians of language and of these at least four, the Indo-European, the Austric, the Tibeto-Chinese (also called Sino-Tibetan), and the Dravidian, are known in India. The first of these families is represented by Sanskrit and the modern Indian languages of northern India and the Deccan such as Kashmiri, Hindi, Panjabi, Sindhi, Bengali, Oriya, Assamese, Gujarati, and Marathi. Uncultivated dialects like Kumaoni, Dogri, and Lambāṇi also belong to this family. The next two families cannot be said to be "properly cultivated" in India as they are known only through dialects "current among the more backward *Ādivāsi* groups."[2] Thus, of the two sub-families, the "Austronesian" and the "Austro-Asiatic," into which the Austric family can be subdivided, only the latter is represented[3] — by the Khāsī, a "Mon-Khmer" language spoken in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills of Assam. More languages are known of what is known as the Muṇḍā group[4] of this sub-family, which is prevalent in Central India. It is a matter of interest that the Greek historians Pliny and Ptolemy appear to be familiar with the speakers of the Savara,[5] a dialect of this group. These languages must once have been spoken in a greater part of India than now but must have been superseded by Dravidian forms of speech in the South and by the Aryan or Tibeto-Burman in the North. But it is not impossible to see, even at the present day, clear Muṇḍā influence on every one of these stronger linguistic families. The harmonic sequence of vowels in the Dravidian Telugu, the extraordinary complexity of the Aryan Biharī, the vigesimal counting among north Indian peasantry, must all be traced to this influence.[6]

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[1] T. G. TUCKER: *Introduction to the Natural History of Language* (London. 1908), pp. 109 ff.

[2] S. K. CHATTERJI: *Adivasis* (Publications Division, Government of India, Delhi), p. 67

[3] G. A. GRIERSON; *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. I, Part i (Delhi, Reprint 1967), p. 33

[4] For fuller details, see *Ibid.*, pp. 34 ff.

[5] Readers, prepared by Ramamurti of Madras, are available for this dialect.

[6] GRIERSON; *loc. cit.*; I. J. S. TARAPOREWALA: *Elements of the Science of Language* (Calcutta. 1951), p. 213

Of the two main branches of the Sino-Tibetan family, the Tibeto-Burman and the Siamese-Chinese, the former is well represented in India — by such languages[7] as Murmi, Magari, Lepcha, Kanaurī, Kirāntī, Bodo, Abor, Miri, Dafla, Naga, Meitheis or Manipuris, and the Lushai. Special mention must be made of Newārī, which is spoken by about 300,000 people who cannot be called tribal as they have maintained, during the last two millennia, vigorous literary and cultural activity. Khamti, spoken in the extreme east of Assam, is the only language known of the Siamese-Chinese branch in India.

Till about a century and a half ago the Dravidian, as a separate family of languages, seems to have been quite unknown. Albirūnī,[8] the Arab historian who speaks about the India of his day (*c.* A.D. 1030), knew only of Sanskrit, which was current "among the upper and educated classes," and of "a neglected vernacular" used by the common people. It looks as if, in the opinion of Albirūnī, the "same spoken language was current over the whole of India." But the later Turkish historian, Amīr Khusrau,[9] an Indian by birth (A.D. 1317), lists "seven Indo-Aryan languages with two dialects and three of the principal Dravidian forms of speech." The Dravidian languages known to him are Dhūr Samundar (Kannada of Mysore), Tilang (Telugu) and Ma'bar (Tamil of the Coromandel coast). The *Āīn-i-Akbarī*[10] of Abul Fazl gives a longer list of the dialects in his time which were "not understood one of another." The list includes two major Dravidian languages, Telingāna (Telugu) and Karnātik (Kannada), but omits the very important language of the family, Tamil.

The earliest recognition of the existence of an Indo-European family of languages is contained in the third Annual Discourse[11] to the Asiatic Society of Bengal by Sir William Jones in 1786:

> The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin and more exquisitely refined than either; yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs, and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong, indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which perhaps no longer exists. There is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both

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[7] For fuller infrmation, see GRIERSON: *op. cit,.* pp. 42 ff.; TARAPOREWALA: *op. cit.* p. 214 ff.; CHATTERJI: *op. cit.*, pp. 70 ff.

[8] *India* (SACHAU'S trans.), I. 18

[9] ELLIOT: *History of India*, III. 562, cited by GRIERSON, *loc. cit.*

[10] JARRETT'S, trans., III. 119

[11] *Asiatic Researches*, I, 422

> the Gothick and the Celtick, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanskrit; and the Old Persian might be added to the same family. ...

But neither Jones, who thus laid the foundation for modern Comparative Philology, nor any of his great successors like Bopp, Grimm, Pott, Schleicher, Whitney, Brugmann, Delbrück, Meillet, and Jespersen, had any idea of the Dravidian languages as a distinct group. It was William Carey, the Baptist Missionary linguist of Serampore in Bengal (1816), who seems to have had an inkling[12] that the South Indian languages like Tamul (Tamil), Kurnata (Kannada), and the Telinga (Telugu) could not also have sprung from Sanskrit like the northern languages such as Bengali, Panjabi, or Hindi. More efficient in this respect was Francis W. Ellis, who worked at the same time in South India. In his "Note" to the Introduction of A. D. Campbell's *A Grammar of the Teloogoo Language* (1816) he includes, in the family called by him " 'the dialects of South India,' the high and low Tamil; the Telugu, grammatical and vulgar; *carnataca* or *canadi,* ancient and modern; *Malya'lma* or Malayalam ... and the *Tuluva,* to which he also added *codugu.* He had also recognized that the language of the mountaineers of Rajmahal, our *Malto,* 'abounds in terms common to the Tamil and Telugu.' "[13] The Danish philologist, Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787–1832) who well deserved "fame as the founder of modern linguistics,"[14] noted, during his world tour in 1824, two distinct types of languages in India, the Indic (north Indian languages) and the Dakanic (south Indian languages). A Krishnamacharya from Śrīrangapaṭṭaṇa in Mysore State had also noticed differences between the Southern and Indo-Aryan languages about this time. B. H. Hodgson (1847) seems to have been

> the first Englishman to use the term "Dravidian" for the languages of Central and Southern India, but he included under that term not only the Dravidian languages proper, but also those of an altogether different family, the Muṇḍā.[15]

The credit of distinguishing between these two distinct bodies of speech and establishing,[16] for the first time, the existence of the Muṇḍā family of languages as apart from the Dravidian, however, belongs to the famous Vedic scholar, F. Max Müller, who wrote a letter to the

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[12] *Linguistic Survey of India,* I. II ; S. K. CHATTERJI : *Dravidian* (Annamalainagar. 1965), p. 7

[13] BURROW and EMENEAU . *Dravidian Etymological Dictionary,* p. V

[14] JOHN T. WATERMAN : *Perspectives in Linguistics* (Chicago. 1963), p. 19

[15] *Linguistic Survey of India,* I. 13

[16] *Ibid.,* I. 14

Chevalier Bunsen, published in 1854. The first man to use[17] "Dravidian" as a term for the family was Robert A. Caldwell, who published in 1856 the first edition of his *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian* or *South Indian Family of Languages*. Though many earlier European writers called the family "Tamulian or Tamulic," Caldwell chose his new term "capable of a wider application" as he wanted to "reserve the terms 'Tamil' and 'Tamilian' ... to denote the Tamil language itself and the people by whom it is spoken." He derives the term "Dravidian" from *Drāviḍa,* the adjectival form of *Draviḍa,* a Sanskrit word well-known in our literature.[18] Of the tribes mentioned by Manu[19] as of Kṣatriyas gradually sunk into the state of *Vṛṣalas* (outcastes) are the Draviḍas, which may denote the South Indian tribes. Earlier in the *Mahābhārata* the Draviḍas are mentioned in the list of degraded Kṣatriyas. Satyavrata, the Indian Noah, is called the "lord of Draviḍa" in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa,*[20] and the sense may be the same. The form *Draviḍa* appears[21] to be a later "modification and an extension" of the form *Dramiḍa,* "in which an intervocalic *-m-* has been changed to a *-v-*." The original form *Dramiḍa* was used definitely to denote the speakers of the Tamil language, just as the term *Āndhra* refers to the speakers of Telugu, *Karṇāṭaka* to the speakers of Kannada and *Kerala* to those who speak Malayalam. But very often in later times it is "used, in a much wider and almost an all-inclusive sense, to indicate what is denoted by 'Dravidian.'"

Medieval India divided the Brahmins known in those times into two main groups, the *Pañca-Gauḍa* and the *Pañca-Drāviḍa*; while the former group includes[22] speakers of Aryan languages only, Gauḍa, Sārasvata, Kānyakubja, Utkala, and Kāśmīra, the latter included five types of Brahmins living in the Deccan and South India who spoke Aryan as well as non-Aryan languages. Under this head come the Gūrjara, Mahārāṣṭra, Kārṇāṭa, Āndhra, and Drāviḍa Brahmins; the last of these five groups includes the Brahmins in Tamilnad as well as in Kerala. The expression *Pañca-Drāviḍa,* therefore, makes a very wide use of the term *Draviḍa* to denote, not only the Tamil Brahmins but also other Brahmins who speak languages of the now well-known Indo-Aryan and Dravidian families, the speakers of Gujarati, Marathi, Kannada, Telugu, and Malayalam. "These names *Pañca-Drāviḍa* and *Pañca-Gauḍa* would apppear to have been first used during the closing centuries of the first millennium A.D., if not earlier."[23]

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17 *Ibid.*; CALDWELL : *Comparative Grammar* (Madras, Third ed., 1956), p. 3 ff.
18 CALDWELL : *op. cit.*, p. 4
19 *Manusmṛti*, X. 43-44 ; CALDWELL, *ibid.*
20 Cited by MUIR : *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. I
21 CHATTERJI ; *Dravidian* (Annamalai University, 1965), pp. 2 ff.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 3 23 *Ibid.*

It is this extensive use of the word Drāviḍa that must have inspired our orthodox Sanskrit scholars, both in north and south India, to believe that "the Dravidian languages of Central and South India, like all other languages of the entire world, came into being through a modification of the language of the Gods, namely Sanskrit." Further, in olden times it was common to believe that "the language of the sacred books of the religion" was also "the oldest of all languages and the mother of all speech."[24] The Jews seem to have "piously believed that all the languages of the world were derived from Hebrew, which was the language used by Jehovah in heaven"; to the Buddhists Māgadhī was the root-language (*mūlabhāṣā*) in which people of the primeval age conversed (*Sā māgadhī mūlabhāṣā*); and to the early Jains the Prākṛt of the Jaina canon was "the basic language on which Sanskrit and the rest stood." So in ancient India the belief was rife that Sanskrit, the language of the gods (*devabhāṣā*), was the "source of all languages." The idea appears to be that "from Sanskrit some kind of Prākṛt evolved, comparable with the other Prākṛts that we know of like *Śaurasenī, Māgadhī* and *Mahārāṣṭrī*; and from this Prākṛt the various Dravidian languages have sprung (*Prakṛtiḥ saṁskṛtaṁ tata āgataṁ prākṛtam*).[25] An old philologist[26] speaks of the language of *Drāviḍa* as a *vibhāṣā* or minor Prākṛt, and another[27] would define *Drāviḍī* as the "language proper to Draviḍas." Even at the present day this view has not become wholly obsolete, and countless old-fashioned and orthodox paṇḍits believe in the Sanskrit origin of the Dravidian languages; only these languages are just five in number: Tamil, Kannada, Telugu, Malayalam, and Tulu. No dialects are included in this group as is done in modern Linguistics. The fact is that the conception of "Linguistic Families" is a very modern one, and the Dravidian, as an independent family of languages, was established just a little over a century ago. Francis W. Ellis, who may well be called the Sir William Jones of the Dravidian family, added,[28] to the list of the traditional five languages of the family, Coḍugu (*Koḍagu*) and Malto. Forty years later, Robert A. Caldwell (later Bishop Caldwell of Tinnevelly in Madras) only "built on Ellis's pioneer work" when he wrote the first Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian family of languages. To the list of dialects of the family known to Ellis, Caldwell added six more names, Toda and Kota, Goṇḍī and Kui, Kurukh and Brahui. Among the few names added to this list of dialects by the *Linguistic Survey of India*[29] are Kolāmī and Pārjī. Now, nearly a score and a half literary

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[24] For full details see CHATTERJI: *Dravidian*, pp. 4 ff.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 5 [26] MUIR: *op. cit.*, II. 46 [27] *Ibid.*, p. 50

[28] BURROW and EMENEAU: *loc. cit.* [29] I. i, pp. 89 ff.; IV. 554 ff.

and non-literary languages of this family are known[30]; and in the former group are four of the official languages recognized by the Republic of India: Tamil of Tamilnāḍu, Kannada of Mysore, Telugu of Āndhra, and Malayalam of Kerala.

Many kinds of sub-groupings[31] of these languages are made, but it is usual now to classify them broadly into three major groups: South Dravidian, Central Dravidian, and North Dravidian. Far from being restricted to South India, the Dravidian family now appears to be spread throughout India. Six languages, three of them literary, are "usually combined" in the Southern group, but the position of two other languages, Telugu and Tulu, in relation to this group is still undetermined. There are scholars who hold that these two "may be early offshoots of the Central rather than the Southern," though the fact remains that both these languages are spoken in South India. The languages which indisputably belong to this group are Tamil, Malayalam, Toda, Kota, Koḍagu and Kannada. Of these, Tamil, spoken by over 33,000,000 people, has a rich and ancient literature[32] known from the third century A.D. Malayalam, spoken by about 20,000,000 people, has a literature[33] dating from about the thirteenth or fourteenth century. Toda is spoken by "about 950 people in the Nilgiri hills at the junction of the Mysore, Kerala and Madras States in the vicinity of Ootacamund." In the same area, in the mountains of Kotagiri, Kota is spoken by about 4,500 people. In the Coorg district of Mysore nearly 70,000 people speak Koḍagu. In a recent artcle[34] Emeneau points out that within the Southern group, Toda, Kota, and Koḍagu are linguistically closer to Tamil and Malayalam than to Kannada. Kannada, spoken by about 16,000,000 speakers, has a literature dating from the tenth century A.D. But the earliest inscription in Kannada dates from *c.* A.D. 450. Baḍaga, spoken by about 67,000 speakers, is considered to be an "offshoot of Kannada."[35] Tulu, spoken by about 800,000 people in the South Kanara District of the Mysore State, has an alphabet but no developed literature. Telugu is spoken by 37,000,000 people; its literature dates from about the twelfth to the fourteenth century,[36] but the oldest Telugu inscription comes from A.D. 633. Savara,

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[30] For an elaborate account of these languages see C. F. and F. M. VOEGELIN: *Anthropological Linguistics*, Vol. 8 (1966), pp. 33 ff.

[31] GRIERSON: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, part i, pp. 83 ff.; VOEGELIN: *loc. cit.*

[32] K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI; *Dravidian Literatures*, pp. 1–23; S. K. CHATTERJI: *Languages and Literatures of Modern India*, pp. 306 ff.

[33] NILAKANTA SASTRI: *Ibid.*, pp. 43 ff.; CHATTERJI: *Ibid.*, pp. 332 ff.

[34] *J.A.O.S.*, (1967), Vol. 87, pp. 365 f.

[35] EMENEAU, *Language* (1939), Vol. XV

[36] NILAKANTA SASTRI: *op. cit.*, pp. 33 ff.

spoken by the Savara Dor in South Koraput in Orissa, is considered "allied to Telugu."

Twelve languages, Kolami, Naiki, Parji, Gadba, Gondi, Koya, Dorli, Konda, Kui, Kuwi, Pengo, and Maṇḍa, all non-literary and spoken by over two million speakers in the States of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, form the Central group of Dravidian. Bh. Krishnamurti[37] would include Telugu also in this group.

The northern group consists of three languages, Kurukh, Malto, and Brahui, again all non-literary and spoken by 845,000 people in all. While Kurukh is "spread over the states of Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal," Malto is "confined to the north-east part of Bihar State." Brahui is "a Dravidian outlier located in the Baluchistan Province of West Pakistan."

As surveys are continuing in different parts of the country it is not impossible that further investigation will discover new Dravidian languages, which are not yet known in any or all the groups of Dravdian.

H. G. NARAHARI

"A Vision of Europe"

A campaign to recall the peoples of Europe, especially the young, to the continent's spiritual heritage and common Christianity, is being launched by the Anglican Coventry Cathedral, and the Roman Catholic Ottobeuren Abbey in Germany. The theme of the campaign is that the preoccuption with Europe's economic and political unity is doomed to turn sterile unless redeemed and enlightened by that spiritual unity which once brought Europe anew out of its Dark Ages, and is needed afresh in this age of materialism. Inaugurating the campaign, called "A Vision of Europe," Provost Williams of Coventry said:

> For all the good work done for the European Communities to graft into a working relationship the economic and political individuality of the constituent nations, yet many old hates and prejudices remain and easily arise. The vision of a Europe of shared responsibility, shared culture, of common determination to protect human values of justice, truth and decency, of shared revulsion against the shoddy materialism and degrading permissiveness corrupting Europe today—such a Vision of Europe is held in the minds of the few and not the many.

Yet without such a vision Europe would perish spiritually.

The "Vision of Europe" movement is being promoted alike by Protestants and Roman Catholics. One of its major concerns is to awaken Europe to its responsibilities towards the Third World, as a vital practical expression of moral and spiritual awareness.

BRIAN G. COOPER

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[37] See his *Telugu Verbal Bases* (California. 1961)

ELIZABETH CROSS

Plenty of Room at the Bottom

[Miss Elizabeth Cross is a very old friend of THE ARYAN PATH indeed, having been a contributor since 1949. Readers will remember her many articles bearing on education and the welfare of children. In this lively and outspoken essay she is saying — what must in essence always be true — that the most important thing for a teacher is to teach, whatever other special lines of study and acquisitions of special techniques may come in as useful auxiliaries.—ED.]

ONCE UPON A TIME there used to be a saying, directed at the innocent young beginner, "There's plenty of room at the top!" this being an encouragement to work hard for final advancement. Now, so far as the common or garden teacher is concerned, the opposite must be true. For those of us who have remained faithful to our job of actually teaching real, live, exhausting children, face to face, we have plenty of room. Yes, plenty of room, in our overcrowded classrooms, for a little help.

But do we get help? Not on your life. We get advice by the bucketful, from Inspectors and Local Inspectors; Music Advisers and Organizers; French Advisers and Organizers; Physical Education Organizers; Mathematical, Scientific, Road Safety, and Speech Therapy specialists; the Police; Tape Recorder Experts; Visual Aid Advisers; and pretty well anything else that a disordered imagination on the part of the educational committee can conjure up.

But, again, should any class-teacher be so thoughtless as to get knocked off her bicycle on the way to work (possibly by a Road Safety Expert!) or catch measles in her germ-laden classroom from some little child who should have been at home in bed (only Mother had to go to work to type out letters for a course in Sex Education) — then is it possible to obtain a spare teacher to look after her class? No, and a thousand times no. The very few spare teachers attached to any local authority are more than taken up by substituting for the other wise teachers who have gone on "Courses" in Esperanto, Greek Dancing, Paper Sculpture, or some such esoteric culture that will, in turn, qualify *them* to become "advisers" and drive other teachers up the wall! Thus the school that is so unlucky as to have a teacher missing has to shuffle a few hundred children around and dole them out so that every class has about ten extra, or even worse, divide the forty-odd into two or three; so you have the frightful task of caring for fifty to sixty six-years-olds at a time.

At the moment the whole set-up is completely top-heavy. Nearly every Education Department seems to be chock-a-block with Directors,

Deputy Directors, Personal Assistants, Educational Psychologists, Speech Therapists, Visual Aiders, Specialists in the New Maths, the New Languages, the New Reading Methods (aided and abetted by remedial this and that workers). All these people, so it seems to the lowly class-teacher, struggling with her great numbers, with her records, with her dinner tickets ("Please, I think Jim has eaten my Dinner Ticket ... I had it in my box just now, and his mouth is all pink and there's bits of paper on his face!"), exist solely and entirely to interrupt and harass her.

Get started on a group lesson in reading (the other thirty are occupied peacefully, you hope, with counting sticks, pattern making, playing shops, or making up a picture story) and in comes a long questionnaire (Please complete at once, County Hall is waiting) from the Reading Investigator — How many children born in 1963 have a Reading Age that is two years lower than their chronological age, and, if so, how many share a bed with a brother or sister, and have they had measles yet? — and a good deal more just as irritating.

Having complied with this, you find a few more forms have come around, suggesting you go for a long week-end (and pay to go) to "Investigate the Environment with a view to More Adventurous Approaches to Social Studies" (what used to be Nature, Geography, and History).

Soon will come a suggestion that you collect and classify Creative Work done by children that are (*a*) Disturbed by Jealousy of Siblings (brothers and sisters to you); (*b*) Upset by School Dinners; (*c*) Violent to Parents; (*d*) Allergic to Windy Weather ... and so on, in order to contribute to a New Thought Exhibition, newly thought up by some newly acquired Research Student, financed by some well-meaning millionaire, who doesn't know how far-reaching his thrown pennies have become.

Once upon a time, in the bad old days when most teachers became teachers because they were interested in children, and had an idea that they could pass on the delights of reading, the mysteries of mathematics, the joy of watching the natural world, to say nothing of many manual skills, such as needlework and other crafts, you planned to be trained and to teach. You became more and more skilled in your own special way, by watching children, by reading more, by making use of spare time and holidays to increase your knowledge. The History people saved up for a longed-for trip to Greece, the Naturalists spent their time in the country; and so on. Often you stayed with your own particular school for a lifetime. You knew your own village, you knew every inch of the land, you knew the people, their traditions, their family history, their problems, their struggles. A good village teacher was a source of strength and wisdom.

Today, village schools are gradually being superseded by the larger ones that serve a neighbourhood. The children are taken around by buses, they lose their identity, and what is more, they usually find no sort of stability in their teachers. The whole emphasis, for the ambitious, is to "get on," and for a teacher to "get on" usually means to "get out." They leave the school where they are beginning to be of real use, and try for something different. When they have had a few more "different" jobs, and a few more "courses," they can get right away from the classroom — right away from the children — and become "advisers," or they can work for an educational publisher, or do "research" (which means bombarding the unfortunate practising teacher with forms to fill up), or go to a College of Education and become lecturers.

Once in a College they can give their fancy full rein, and send out students by the hundred to harass the class-teachers still more. The latest tactic is to send a real squad of students, say thirty to one class: one to one, lively bare-legged girls and whiskery boys, all gay and giggly and smoking like chimneys (let's have fun with the children). Each student has one child, all over the corridors. Move the tables and chairs, upset the plant pots; now, let's see if we can answer some questions. Never mind if we can't write down the answers — it's all contact and communication.

Another idea is to have team teaching, because one day it'll be all Open-Plan, no walls, no classrooms, just one big jolly noise; so we'll get used to having four teachers in a room, we'll dance and sing (and have the record player on, because we can't really sing or understand written music, but anyway that's a bit out of date, isn't it?). So we get four or five lively young people who haven't a clue to what they are meant to be doing, and their College Organizer hasn't a clue either, but she does so hope the School and the teachers will co-operate, because *communication* is really what we are after, isn't it? And we must make the students welcome and happy, or they might leave the College and then the College staff might be out of a job, and that *would* be sad!

Then they feel surprised that the students, after their final non-exam, and their arrival in their first job, and their confrontation with their first full class (and don't believe those little jokes about no class over thirty-five: come and see the real ones of over forty), get stage-fright, and disappear into the peaceful world of commerce, modelling, or whatever more profitable channels abound.

I have a very simple plan to lower the size of classes. Just divert the whole world of educationists (a handy word that could cover pretty well anyone who can read, write, count to a hundred, stand upright and smile at any set of over thirty mixed young demons) into the classroom. They'd

only need a month at the most to get the message. Let all the Directors, Deputy Directors, and every inhabitant of the ivory towers have the responsibility of taking care of something similar to my little lot, from 8.30 a.m. (when they're clamouring to get in, because "Mother's gone to work") through Dinner Ticket Time, Milk, Toilets, Being Sick on the Floor, Dinner, Dinner Play, Cut Knees, Nose Bleeds, "Look, My Dog's Got In," Music, Football, Home, Looking After the Bus Children for the extra half-hour and driving home the one that missed the bus, to around 5 p.m. when the last Mother who came "to find out how our Jim got his lip cut last night, because that Bill was paying him out for what happened in the playground yesterday," finally departs muttering threats of "seeing the Authorities."

After this little refresher course I have an idea that Something might be done. It might, of course, be merely suicide, or perhaps they might realize that all a teacher really needs is a smaller class, a bit less advice, no more interruptions, and a chance to get on with the job.

If all this sounds like a nightmare — well, the reader has got the message. Because it really is; but it happens every day.

ELIZABETH CROSS

Falling Star

It was as if a falling star
shattered into fragments
of stardust at my feet.
a million glow-worms
glittered in the grass,
illuminating the flowers.
I alone, iron shod, wingless
child of Earth
amongst the glory of Heaven.

URSULA MACDONALD

DAVID GUNSTON

Noise Can Affect Our Health

[Mr. David Gunston has written several brief articles in THE ARYAN PATH, communicating the interesting or practical results of some recent scientific work. In this article he summarizes some extremely important information about the effects of noise upon the human constitution. He is right in ending his article with the suggestion that each one of us has a part to play in preserving the possibilities of quietness in our civilization.—ED.]

THINK for a moment of the effect noise has on you. Can you truthfully say you are completely indifferent to it? Unless you are under eighteen or so, this is unlikely. Do you manage to live with it not too unhappily? Perhaps — but its effects may not have made themselves felt yet. Or does it tend to drive you crazy at times?

It really can do just this, and every day the world becomes a noisier place. In fact, many doctors are now convinced that there is a direct relationship between the growing tide of stress ailments that beset us today — gastric ulcers, hypertension (high blood pressure), heart disease, and other degenerative disorders — and the unconscious tension caused by the nerve-jangling noise all around us.

For there is no doubt whatever that excessive and prolonged noise can have a damaging effect on the human mind and body. Recent medical tests have shown that constant exposure to a disturbing level of noise can result in an unnaturally high body temperature, digestive upsets, impaired vision, mental unbalance, and, eventually, insanity. Other experiments have demonstrated that even such a mild noise as a baby suddenly crying loudly can cause an adult's heart to double the quantity of blood it pumps, while a sudden and unexpected door slamming can rocket an apparently healthy man's blood pressure four times — more than the reaction from a shot of morphine.

When Dr. Claude Fortier, working at the University of Montreal, studied the effects of noise on laboratory rats, making them live on a constant level of noise stress caused by an electric siren, he found evidence of swift physical degeneration. Among other things, his rats developed stomach ulcers, their thymus glands atrophied, and their adrenal glands became over-stimulated.

At the very least, the forced increase in oxygen consumption that comes from even a small rise in blood pressure caused by nagging noise can result in exhaustion and irritability.

Slowly but definitely, these facts are being recognized. Before long, cutting down noise, hushing or muffling the daily din of modern life, will

be quite an industry — and not before it is time. Already in the U.S.A., quite the world's noisiest country on the whole, over forty major manufacturing companies are actively engaged in noise control, with over fifteen hundred top-level experts, physicists, neurologists, acoustical engineers, and mathematicians, working full-time on this growing problem.

More and more of the world's cities have definite anti-noise regulations, although these rarely go far enough. So far, these mostly concern the noise made by traffic, road works, and radio and TV sets. More control is still needed over street vendors' sound devices, like the icecream-seller's "chimes," dustbin-emptying; and the observance of quiet in special zones near churches, hospitals, and the like. New York City already has jail penalties for those who play radios, TV or records too loudly between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., but of course such regulations are hard to enforce and easy to flout. Even Moscow bans the blowing of car-horns, and the city's traffic director claims a 10-per-cent drop in the road accident rate because of it.

Noise can be fought or reduced in many other ways, often in the simplest. More people, especially in industrial jobs, or at night, can be induced to wear effective ear-plugs. Large firms are recognizing the value of having their grounds skilfully landscaped with thick shrubs and evergreen trees to cut out traffic and other outside din. Others, too, are moving to quieter spots, away from congested factory areas. The eventual adoption for city use of small electric cars will undoubtedly greatly reduce the almost incessant traffic roar of today's world.

In one admirably noise-conscious firm the simple sound-proofing of its offices cut absenteeism there by 37 per cent and staff resignations by as much as 47 per cent. When another company became worried by the high rate of imperfect products at the end of an assembly line near a busy, throbbing boiler room, 80 per cent of all output, it tried the experiment of moving the line and its workers to a quiet spot. Almost at once daily production jumped nearly 30 per cent, while the imperfections were reduced by 90 per cent.

Everywhere, ordinary folk are becoming conscious of the merits of peace and quiet, and they are increasingly demanding sound-proofing in their homes as a matter of course. "Quiet" homes, not merely because of their locality, are at a premium. Fibreglass used in the construction of walls and other sound-absorbing material incorporated in the framework of modern dwellings is going a long way towards cutting out undue external noise, like that of traffic and neighbours.

In addition, household appliances can be made to operate more quietly. Dish-washers, washing-machines, driers, vacuum-cleaners, and the like

can all benefit from noise suppression, and more manufacturers are now turning their attention to this, again often achieving it through the use of fibreglass. "Within five to ten years," says one physicist working on the problem, "all or most home appliances will have partial or complete sound-proofing." The cost of this is usually minimal.

Today's mounting crescendo of noise needs much more of this type of approach. It also urgently needs greater publicity of its ill-effects, a concerted effort to avoid making unnecessary noise on every level, plus a general thoughtfulness among people generally.

As is well known, the loudness, or intensity, of sound is measured in decibels. Here are some typical decibel levels: the rustling of leaves on a summer tree, 10 decibels; a domestic ventilation fan, 55 decibels; average conversation at three feet, 62 decibels; a vacuum cleaner in use 90 decibels; the siren of the "Queen Elizabeth," heard from 75 feet, 120 decibels; jet aircraft on take-off, anything from 100–120 decibels upwards; a pneumatic road-drill or riveter at four feet, 130 decibels. Medical experts agree that prolonged exposure to noise of 95–100 decibels upwards is a definite hazard to health. Temporary but unpleasant deafness can result from even a few minutes' exposure to a decibel level of 100–120.

Huge modern jet aircraft are undoubtedly one of the worst threats on the noise front, and already the aeroplane-makers have spent many millions trying to find a solution. So far, however, very little has been achieved, and it looks as though, somehow, we have got to learn to live with this particularly irritating form of contemporary noise. As one aircraft authority warns: "This is something which is going to get worse, not better. The public will have to learn to live with it — or move away from the vicinity of airports."

This is chilling news, of course, but in the face of modern technological progress, perhaps inevitable. Nevertheless, today's roaring, clanking, whining, clattering, clanging, ear-shattering world is becoming increasingly an unhealthy place in which to live and work, often to a quite unnecessary degree.

If more people realized that noise can literally drive one crazy, perhaps we might have greater respect for the healing virtue of quiet, if only to the degree of enduring *less* noise. Every single one of us can play a part in this, of course.

DAVID GUNSTON

New Books and Old

"The Number of Rasas"*

WHILE IT IS TRUE that European scholars like Jacobi and Sylvain Lévi were the pioneers in the historico-critical study of Indian poetics, Indian scholars like S. K. De and Dr. P. V. Kane who followed in their wake have given a more exhaustive and sustained treatment of the subject in their monumental histories. Yet, for a complete study of the individual concepts themselves, we must turn to the numerous papers and books of Dr. Raghavan, which have deservedly won high praise in scholarly circles as models of painstaking industry and unpretentious clarity. Dr. Raghavan has a knack for tracking down references and allusions to concepts in the remotest corner of the vast realm of published and unpublished material in Sanskrit. Neither a poet's casual reference nor an unknown scholiast's passing remark with any bearing on poetics escapes Dr. Raghavan's hawk-eye. He sets out the quotation in full complete with references, and presents an inner picture of even unchartered territory.

The present work (whose first edition appeared as early as 1940) is concerned with an interesting aspect of what is perhaps the most important concept in Sanskrit poetics, viz. *Rasa,* and it already bears all the marks of the author's individuality.

Professor Hiriyanna in his Foreword to the first edition said: "Dr. Raghavan makes a valuable contribution to the study not merely of Sanskrit literary criticism but of Indian Aesthetics as a whole," and time has only confirmed his verdict. In the present edition the author has added new material on problems like the identity of *Ālaṁbana* and *Sthāyin* in the *Śānta*; the treatment of *Bhakti* by Bopadeva and Hemādri; the *Māyā* and *Citra Rasas*; the varieties of *Vipralambha*; and *Vīra,* besides referring to additional texts. The printing and the get-up of the book are excellent, as can be expected of an Adyar Library publication (one misprint noticed is *ekānna* for *ekona* on p. 98).

As we read on, we are introduced to a multitude of views held about the nature of *sthāyibhāva* and *rasa*; the justification or otherwise for regarding *Śānta* as a *rasa*; and the divergent opinions about one original *rasa* of which the recognized ones might all be regarded as modifications. If one seeks a guiding principle in deciding between the different opinions on the main issues, I am afraid it is difficult to get it here. For example, Professor Hiriyanna (Foreword, p. xi) seems to differentiate *sthāyibhāva* from *rasa* when he says:

> ... it is desirable to distinguish the emotive content or theme of a literary work from the aesthetic sentiment which, according to the prevalent Indian view, its idealized representation evokes in the reader or the spectator.

Such a distinction is rendered impossible if we give any weight at all to Bharata's text and the views of his commentators prior to Abhinavagupta. A statement like Māgha's

> *"Sthāyino'rthe pravartante*
> *Bhāvāḥ sañcāriṇo yathā."*
> *Rasasyaikasya Bhūyāṁsaḥ ...*
>
> (II. 87

would become a blunder, because he says *rasa* when he means *sthāyibhāva*. Dr. Raghavan also appears to be guided by Abhinavagupta in thinking that

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**The Number of Rasas.* By V. RAGHAVAN. (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras. xxvi + 230 pp. Second, revised and enlarged ed., 1967. Rs. 18.00)

since India has a uniquely vast *Mokṣa*-literature, critical theory must account for it by admitting *Śānta* as a *rasa*. How would Dr. Raghavan explain Bhartṛhari's *Vairāgyaśataka*, whether the *sthāyibhāva* there is to be characterized as *Śama* or *Nirveda* or *Vairāgya* or *Tattvajñāna*? If the whole of Indian religious literature can be subsumed under a variety of *rati* (*Sthāyibhāva*) which becomes enjoyable as such, and *not* as *Śṛṅgāra-rasa*, why should not ascetic literature also be classed only as a *bhāva* (*rati* or *utsāha*) rendered delectable and not raised artificially to the rank of *rasa*? If there is a modern poetry of patriotism in Sanskrit, need one invent a new *rasa* to explain it? Would not *bhāva*, though only *vyabhicārī*, do? It seems to me that the ancient idea of *rasa* in no way belittled the poetic quality or degree of any *sthāyibhāva*. Whether in a given plot of a whole poem or drama, the characters and situation, the mood and tone, co-operated towards the heightening of a simple *sthāyibhāva* is all that can be affirmed by calling it a *rasa*. That Bharata and others regarded *sthāyibhāva* itself under certain circumstances as *rasa* is the view which seems more probable. This truth does not affect the fundamental problem of aesthetics. This aspect of practical application of the *sthāyibhāva-rasa* concept deserves treatment in greater detail by the learned author. Whether *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* cannot make excellent poetry, though not ranked as *rasa*, is an allied question.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Vedic Studies. Vol. II. By A. VENKATASUBBIAH. (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras. 280 pp. 1968)

There is genuine difficulty in interpreting ancient books like the Vedas for which one can find no contemporary literature offering clues to the meaning of words, or any objective data that can lead to legitimate conclusions. Sometimes old books are brought up to date by scribes who take liberties with the text, but in the case of the Vedas the traditional oral transmission of the texts has hardly allowed any scope for this. As a result, the ancient words, which have changed their meaning with time, have been interpreted by many in an anachronistic way, and those words which have become obsolete are being subjected to unrestricted speculation. In the latter process the recourse to argument by analogy, in which the Vedas are interpreted in the light of foreign mythologies believed to be allied to them, has taken us no nearer the real meaning.

It is usual for the students and teachers of the Vedas and others interested in their meaning to depend on some authority, whether old or new, Indian or Western, without knowing that there are other eminent authorities who hold different views on the subject. For an academic study of the Vedas it is necessary for one to know what the leading scholars have to say about certain words and how they differ in their opinions. The learned Dr. Venkatasubbiah has made such knowledge available in respect of 95 single or compound Vedic words, and 357 passages quoted from Vedic literature, of which 346 are from the *Ṛgveda*. He has quoted conflicting opinions of recognized authorities, and, expressing his disagreement, has given his own meanings for expressions supported by scholastic opinion as well as parallel passages drawn from the Vedas themselves.

Everybody interested in the meaning of the Vedas has reason to be grateful to Dr. Venkatasubbiah for his detailed treatment of the subject in hand. For an idea of what he has done we may give an example. Let us take his discussion on *ṚV*., 1.122.2 (pp. 130–7). The question is: What does the Vedic poet say here about Dawn and Night? Does he say, as Grassmann thinks, that they are "like two housewives of whom one, Dawn, is wrapped in virgin-woven cloth ... gold-bedecked in the glory of the sun"? Or, as Ludwig thinks, that

"Night is the sterile one who wraps herself in broad woven cloth ... and Dawn is beautiful with the sun's splendour"? Or, as Pischel supposes, that "Night resembles a sterile woman in her stillness and her loneliness in contrast to Dawn, the Hetaera, who looks fine"? (This scholar presumably thinks of the Greek Dawn and her human lover.) Or does the poet say, as Geldner believes, "that Night and Dawn are two wives of the sun, one like a sterile woman clothed in cast-off raiment, the other with the splendour of the sun"? Or should we agree with the author, according to whom the poet says that "Night and Dawn are seen (appear before us) diversely, one wearing stars ... as ornaments, the other looking beautiful with gold ornaments in the splendour of the sun"?

We may suggest that in addition to the meaning of words, the spirit of the hymns to Dawn and Night may be taken into consideration. Pischel, we presume, would not have thought as he did, had he remembered such prayers of poets to Goddess Dawn as "Give us every blissful thought" (*ṚV.*, I.123.13), or, "We wish to be Thine as sons are of the mother (*syāma mātur na sūnavaḥ — ṚV.*, VIII.81.4)

Sometimes our author accepts meanings which, we think, are not justified: e.g., *ṛtena* = "by the spell of truth" (p. 33). Here "spell' is superimposed, and, inasmuch as the Veda speaks of *Ṛta* (Eternal Law. *Dharman, Dharma*) and *Satya* (Truth) together, the two words must have distinct meanings, though their ethical implications cover common ground.

We hope further volumes of the *Vedic Studies* will follow.

We wonder if Dr. Venkatasubbiah, whose lively interest, like that of other Indian scholars, in the newly discovered pre-Sāyaṇa commentaries is referred to in the late Professor L. Renou's book, *The Destiny of the Veda in India* (1965), has considered the French savant's suggestion (p. 81) that the material should be further exploited in the interpretation of the Vedas.

A. C. BOSE

Comparative Religion in Education: A Collection of Studies. By H. J. BLACKHAM, F. H. HILLIARD, JOHN R. HINNELLS, O. R. JOHNSTON, E. G. PARRINDER, ERIC J. SHARPE, NINIAN SMART. Edited by JOHN R. HINNELLS. (Oriel Press, Newcastle upon Tyne. x+115 pp. 1970. 25*s*., i.e. £1.25)

Comparative religion has come to the fore in the British educational system, and to some extent within British religious life, in the past decade. The coming of Commonwealth citizens of Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh faith has already made Britain a multi-religious society; television has given the younger generation an awareness that Christianity is but one of several major world religions; disenchantment with traditional ecclesiastical forms in the West has produced a widespread fascination with Oriental religions, some of whose aspects have become popularized — at the cost, one fears, of being trivialized — through "pop" culture. The very nature of religious education itself in a "post-Christian society" is now hotly debated, and this series of essays by British experts, both Christian and non-Christian, will be widely welcomed by British educationists, besides containing much information and wise comment for a wider constituency.

Eric Sharpe's historical perspective traces the gradual growth of interest in comparative religious studies as background to the current preoccupation.

Professor Ninian Smart of Lancaster, whose department of religious studies is the most advanced of its kind anywhere in Europe, carefully analyses the structure of the comparative study of religion, arguing powerfully for the distinction always to be drawn between "doing theology" and "studying religion objectively." History of religions, typological and speculative phenomenology, sociology of religion and anthropology, and the psychology of religion together comprise a distinct

group of categories of study, as distinct from theologies, philosophy, and dialogue between religions.

H. J. Blackham, former Director of the British Humanist Association, discusses the humanist approach to the teaching of religion in schools, arguing for moral education in social obligations separate from credal instruction. Of course, if a majority in a society reject its traditional religious commitment, a new approach to the transmission of moral values must be sought: this is a critical problem for many Western societies today.

O. R. Johnston's "Christian Approach" will be rejected by most Christians as too "fundamentalist" and by members of other religions on different grounds. As a Christian, I would reject his assertion that Christianity "implies a judgement upon all other religious systems." I do believe that the life of Christ is the touchstone by which the life of all men — both Christian and non-Christian — can be truly evaluated in terms of the life-style of love-for-others. But the Christian Church has been guilty of so much arrogance in the past that it is high time that both personally and institutionally we Christians recognized our own enormous shortcomings and stopped talking about judging others, recalling Jesus' own stern warnings to those who presumed to do such. Johnston does commend the value of "the way of dialogue" but what that entails, in terms of mutual exploration, humility, and willingness to be at risk, needs fuller explanation than this volume contains.

The book also includes an excellent short chapter by E. G. Parrinder on "The Ethics and Customs of the Main Immigrant Peoples," with specific reference to the current British situation.

BRIAN G. COOPER

The Psychology of Nirvana. By RUNE E. A. JOHANSSON. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 141 pp. 1969. 35*s.*, i.e. £1.75)

Professor Johansson, with a background of travel and study in the East, has also a keen interest in psychology. Hence his scholarly survey, on the theme of *Nibbāna* (Nirvana), concentrated on the oldest Pali writings, relates the ideas to Western psychology. His approach is intellectual, psychological, and semantic, not historical or philosophical; still less is it devotional. He has meticulously collected together texts (Pali with English translation) about particular concepts, using Western psychology to analyse and define their meanings. He modestly admits this makes limitations, but hopes, nevertheless, to be helpful, since the Pali *Nikāyas* give more psychological analyses and explanations than any other ancient literature.

Without claiming any final solution to "*Nibbāna*," he reviews it in relation to "cognition" (intuition), to "cool" happiness, the destruction of desire, the stilling and purifying of *citta* (mind, functional self). He takes up its meaning as "emptiness," of freedom from rebirth, as well as the analogy between "release" and "extinction" as of a fire. The chapters on personality factors and the eightfold path show how extensively worked out Buddhist psychology is, and how practical are the exercises in "mindfulness" and "concentration." Professor Johansson finds "*Arahant*" ("worthy," "the perfect man," "saint") puzzling in meaning, since the title — in the texts researched — is applied to a "rather heterogeneous crowd," but concludes that "perfection is a relative concept." He tends to look upon *Nibbāna* as an "experienced" subjective state rather than a metaphysical one, "transcending space, time and causality." Finally he judges that the psychologist's "mental health" expresses a very different philosophy from *Nibbāna,* despite similarities. The first stresses society and activity (no matter what goal) while the Buddha stressed "Individual development to internal freedom and intelligent judgement, 'disinterested' action, balance and stability."

There may be too strong a humanistic proclivity throughout, yet the author's diligent collation and analysis of the Buddhist texts has opened up a mine well worth working.

E. WHITE

The Anatomy of Knowledge: Papers Presented to the Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity, Bowdoin College, 1965 and 1966. By E. P. WEIGNER *et al.* Edited by MARJORIE GRENE. (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. xii+367 pp. 1969. £3.00)

The Study Group on Foundations of Cultural Unity founded by Michael Polanyi, Marjorie Grene, and Edward Pols is now named the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge, based at the University of California, Davis. It aims to bring together in "one common movement of thought" the "new centres of resistance" to the current scientific standpoint, now showing in various fields.

The papers presented are grouped under "Foundations Problems in the Sciences" and "Philosophical Perspectives," completed by Elizabeth Sewell's "Epilogue," a long poem "Cosmos and Kingdom." The fundamental theme of the book is that, although the method of reasoning and the mode of approach of modern physical science have produced outstanding instrumental successes, neither the method nor the approach are validly applicable to other fields of investigation. In a number of searching essays, physicists, biologists, philosophers, writers, and others all join together to emphasize that physical knowledge is only one form of knowledge among many; knowledge itself may be gathered by many and diverse means. Especially interesting is the essay by Professor Barry Commoner tracing out some of the inappropriate results of uncritically transferring the methods of physical science to biology.

This volume is a refreshing attempt to vindicate the provenance and the methods of inquiry of the non-physical sciences. It thus represents a notable addition to the intellectual tradition of Critical Rationalism.

SUDHA R. SHENOY

Anthropology and Archaeology: Essays in Commemoration of Verrier Elwin. Edited by M. C. PRADHAN, R. D. SINGH, P. K. MISRA and D. B. SASTRY. (Oxford University Press, Bombay. 328 pp. 1969. Illustrated. Rs. 30.00)

This handy volume is virtually a lasting monument to Verrier Elwin's pioneering achievements in the field of social anthropology in India, the homeland of his adoption. He will always be remembered by the succeeding generations as a paragon of applied anthropology. As a field-worker, he identified himself with the tribal population — so vast and varied — of India as none else had before him. His sympathy with the tribal people in their sufferings, his active interest in the betterment of their conditions, his concern for the solution of their problems, and his efforts to win recognition for their arts and crafts all overshot the normal functions of an anthropologist. It need hardly be mentioned that he also chose a tribal belle for his life-partner.

The first two essays, one by M. C. Pradhan, entitled "Verrier Elwin As Anthropologist," and the other by Frank Fernandez, entitled "A Critique of Verrier Elwin's Anthropology: Hill Bondo Social Organization and Kinship Analysis," afford an intimate appraisal of our hero's personality and major contribution. Some of his earlier works, as, for example, *The Baiga, The Agaria*, and *Maria Murder and Suicide*, are highlighted. A more or less complete Bibliography of his publications — books, articles, etc. — is given at the end, which covers some 180 titles, beginning with the year 1924 — *The Praise of His Glory* (poems) — and ending with the year 1968 — *The Kingdom of the Young* — besides *A New Book of Tribal Fiction*, reported to be in press,

obviously to be issued posthumously. Elwin thus died in harness. Though he never taught at any university, his influence was felt in both public and governmental circles.

> His writings greatly helped the Government of India in formulating and, to some extent, in implementing a well-thought-out policy towards the Indian tribals. Later, as Adviser to the NEFA administration, Elwin himself was responsible for a few policies which were accepted and implemented in that part of the country. (p. 14)

Of the remaining essays, eleven cover a wide range of anthropology and only two deal with prehistoric archaeology. These last are sumptuously illustrated. The one dealing with "Pebble Chopper/Chopping Tools and Flakes in India and Pakistan," by D. Sen, constitutes a comprehensive review in the light of recent finds in Europe and Asia in the context of Old World prehistory and seeks to provide an answer to the intriguing problem: who are the artificers of Early Stone Age industry? The other, restricted in scope, treats of "Early Village Communities of the Banas Basin, Rajasthan." In this, its learned author, V. N. Misra, shows how the Ahar chalcolithic culture, remains of which have recently been laid bare in the valley of the river Banas in southern Rajasthan, contributes to the bridging of the gap between prehistory and history in India.

Reverting to anthropology, in H. R. H. Prince Peter's essay on "Patterns of Polyandry in Tibet and India," the Tibetan practice of polyandry is compared with that prevailing elsewhere in Asia and especially in Kerala among the Malayalis and in the Nilgiris among the Todas. The author concludes that it is not a primitive form of marriage and that it is found among people with a higher culture. P. G. Ganguly offers some useful observations regarding "Separatism in the Indian Polity: A Case Study," mainly based on the data gathered by him during his fieldwork in Jamshedpur and other areas of the Chota Nagpur Plateau. Stemming from the so-called obscure Adibasi movement in the exotic highlands of the Chota Nagpur Plateau, he touches the major complexities of today such as the creation of Pakistan, the carving out of Andhra, the Panjabi Suba agitation, the birth of Haryana, and the D.M.K. movement.

Equally readable are the other essays, whose themes are apparent from their very titles: Beatrice Diamond Miller's "Revitalization Movements: Theory and Practice" (as evidenced among the Buddhists of Maharashtra); Kathleen Gough's "Political Party Conflict in a Kerala Village" (the village chosen as an example being Palakkara in Central Kerala); Harold A. Gould's "A Theory of Social Stratification and the Case of Indian Society"; Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf's "Morality and Prestige among the Nagas"; John V. Ferreira's "Finitude, Complementarity and Dependence in Primitive Societies"; Francis L. K. Hsu's "Christianity and the Anthropologist"; M. C. Pradhan's "Some Aspects of the Jat Religion and Ethics"; Stephen Fuch's "Applied Anthropology in India"; and Norman Zide and R. D. Munda's "Descriptive Dialogue Songs in Mundari."

The Index at the end is equally useful.

B. CH. CHHABRA

Journal of the American Oriental Society. Volume 89, Number 1: January–March 1969. Editor: ERNEST BENDER. (The American Oriental Society, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. 310 pp.)

The Journal of the American Oriental Society reveals that the American Oriental Society is outstandingly well-organized; that the range of its Oriental scholars and the luxuriance of their scholarship in many, many branches of Oriental learning far surpasses Oriental scholarship in Oriental countries, which means that Americans are well "oriented" to Oriental Studies. This Number has very learned articles indeed: on "Sumerian

Similes," on "Akkadian Vocabulary," on "Modern South Arabian Determination," on "The Customary Laws of Vellālar Chettiyars," on "Redundancy in Mahābhārata Verse Composition," on "The Morphology of the Verb in Modern Syriac," and other articles of the same type. All the articles abound in meticulous scholarship. It may be that these articles are of no "use" to many, but they will find here that exactness of language and terminology can be and is as exact as exactness in the exact sciences. It is not, of course, possible to describe or even summarize any of the articles. Among review-articles, there is one on "Contributions to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism" by Alex Wayman on Frederick J. Sheng's book, *Emptiness — A Study in Religious Meaning*. And among the many "Brief Communications," there are thirteen reviews of books by Indian authors. This review ought appropriately to end with a word of congratulation to the Editor.

N. A. NIKAM

A Sufi Martyr: The Apologia of 'Ain al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī. Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. J. ARBERRY. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 101 pp. 1969. 28*s*.)

The thoroughness of this work is an impressive example of Professor Arberry's unique scholarship in the interpretation of Islamic texts. His beautifully readable translation, with detailed notes of his own, allows us to hear again across eight hundred years the passionate plea for understanding of a great saint, whose grasp of essential truth was too much for his contemporaries. That plea was in vain then, but the Sufi's martyrdom can bear fruit today in the extremity of our own present danger.

Human reason is solving nothing, but there is a wisdom beyond our reason which explains everything. This is the wisdom gained in seeking God, possessing which a man is one with God and all conflicts are dissolved for him. He sees the true nature of what is hateful to the ignorant and its essential function in the perfection of God's entire scheme. (The last Appendix — on Iblis, the personification of evil — is a striking description of this particular insight.)

In this age of misdirection, when man's breath-taking powers are making of our life on earth an increasing chaos, a thoughtful study of Professor Arberry's small book could be of the greatest help to anyone seeking a way out.

We have gone to the moon at last, and found little we could not learn here. Must we go hell-bent for the stars and waste more time we cannot afford, before we can learn to sit quietly for just a little while and see that the key to all truth, including the mysteries of the universe, is nowhere but within us — the freedom to believe or to refuse to believe in the beauty, the love, the all-comprehending purposeful order, which is God?

D. S. MAXTED

Some Thoughts on Indian Aesthetics and Literary Criticism. By K. KRISHNAMOORTHY. (Prasaranga, University of Mysore. 90 pp. 1968. Rs. 2.00)

This tractate embodies three lectures the author delivered, by special invitation, under the auspices of the Mysore University. By his twenty-five years' experience of teaching and close study of the original Sanskrit texts in general and Sanskrit poetics in particular, Dr. Krishnamoorthy is eminently competent to offer his thoughts on Indian aesthetics and literary criticism. What is novel about these lectures is that they attempt to approach the concept of beauty as revealed in the Sanskrit texts in the light of present-day thinking on aesthetics.

The first lecture deals with the nature and scope of Indian aesthetics, basing the treatment on first-hand quota-

tions from Sanskrit rhetoricians and literary masters. It rightly concludes that Indian aesthetics, comparable to modern aesthetical thought, sets forth aesthetic standards in relation to the work of art, the artist's purpose, the artist's experience, and the critic's experience; thus traversing with deep penetration "the whole gamut of aesthetic experience ... the crown being provided by spiritual joy or *Śānta* [*rasa*]."

The second lecture attempts a restatement of Indian aesthetics in theory and practice with special reference to *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the graphic arts. In a rapid survey of the general postulates and ideas of aesthetics from Bharata to Abhinavagupta, the author pertinently picks out for discussion and definition the two key words, *rasa* and *bhāva*. He examines the concepts underlying these two words historically, semantically, and philosophically, basing his remarks on quotations from Sanskrit works on poetics and from literature, especially the works of Kalidasa. He concludes:

> ... *bhāva* is the feeling content actually embodied by the poet in the art form, while *rasa* is the culminating point and the result of *bhāva* on the part of the critic.
> ... *rasa* is only another name for a heightened *sthāyibhāva*, when relished by the critic ... *rasa* is the very life of the pictorial as well as the dramatic art. ... a cultivated aesthetic sensibility alone can enjoy *rasa*. ... *rasa* is involved as the soul of aesthetic experience ... (pp. 53, 59, 60-61)

The third lecture, devoted to "The 'Dhvani' School of Criticism," stands out as the best in the series, by its distinctive unity of treatment and sensitive and highly eloquent concentrated exposition. The *Dhvani* theory propounded by Ānandavardhana represents a high-water mark in Indian aesthetics and rightly evokes the author's highest praise. The references to *Dhvani* and Ānandavardhana run like a golden thread throughout his first two lectures and naturally prepare the reader for the full treatment in the third. The crux of the *Dhvani* theory, viz., that *rasa* and *rasa* alone is *Dhvani par excellence* is interpreted by the author as follows:

> ... it [*rasa*] has only one meaning relevant to poetry, viz., the organic or patterned experience-situation embodied in the poem pointing both to the contemplating emotion of the poet at the one end and of the critic at the other. (p. 70)
>
> The ideal critic is a *sahṛdaya* or one with the temperament of a poet. The poet creates and the critic recognizes poetry because he recreates it in himself, being of a kindred heart. The poet and the critic are not two different units; they are two faces of one living principle. ... This is the basic finding of the *Dhvani* theorists headed by Ānandavardhana. (p. 63)

What distinguishes Dr. Krishnamoorthy's exposition of the *Dhvani* theory is his setting it in the context of contemporary aesthetic thought. The author does not stop short at mere theoretical discussion but blazes a new trail by venturing forth into its practical application to some Western and some Sanskrit pieces of poetry (pp. 77–87).

All three lectures, enriched by apt allusions to classic works in Sanskrit aesthetics and classical Sanskrit literature and Western literature and criticism, testify to the author's wide scholarship and the fresh, modern outlook he brings to bear upon the subject. His exposition and appreciation of aesthetic and literary passages stamp the author as a scholar of fine, creative literary taste, a true *sahṛdaya à la* Ānandavardhana.

V. M. BEDEKAR

The Daśarūpaka of DHANAMJAYA with the commentary *Avaloka* by DHANIKA and the sub-commentary *Laghuṭīkā* by BHATTANRSIMHA. Edited with Introduction and notes by T. VENKATACHARYA. (Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras. lxxv+343 pp. 1969.)

Of this important treatise on dramaturgy and poetics at least four earlier editions are already known; the first, published by Fitzedward Hall during 1861–5 at Calcutta in the *Bibliotheca Indica* of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, contains also the commentary *Avaloka* by Dhanika, but it is full of misprints. In 1878 came the edition published by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, again at Calcutta. This is merely a reprint of Hall's edition, with all its defects, though without acknowledgment. The edition prepared by K. P. Parab and published by the Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay, in 1897, is but another reprint of Hall's text but with a good deal of improvement. The next edition of the text which came from George C. O. Haas (Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series, No. 7, New York, 1912) no doubt reproduces the same text, barring a dozen alterations; but it has the merit of giving the first English translation of this extremely valuable work.

The present edition from Madras repeats, no doubt, the old text and the commentary, but it gives in addition the *Laghuṭīkā* by Bhaṭṭanṛsiṁha on the *Avaloka*. This *ṭīkā*, however, is not a running commentary on all the lines of Dhanika's gloss on the text or the *Kārikas*. Only those difficult lines or expressions which are not easily understood or have not been satisfactorily explained so far come within its purview. In the fairly long Introduction prefixed to the text (pp. xxix ff.) the editor explains how on very many occasions this *ṭīkā* has helped him give a better text of the *Avaloka* and therefore a clearer understanding of the idea of its author. The editor also claims to have been able to give a better text of the seven *Kārikās* cited by Dhanika under IV.37 of the main text (p. 212). As many as six MSS., four from the Adyar collection and one each from the Madras Government collection and the University of Kerala, Trivandrum, have helped him, not only in editing the new *ṭīkā*, but also in correcting the old and familiar *Avaloka* in many places.

The get-up of the book is neat in accordance with the time-honoured traditions of the Vasanta Press, Adyar, and both the young editor and his publisher deserve to be congratulated on this welcome aid to students of Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy.

H. G. NARAHARI

Ghalib 1797–1869. Vol. I: Life and Letters. Translated and edited by RALPH RUSSELL and KHURSHIDUL ISLAM. (Unesco Collection of Representative Works: Indian Series. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 404 pp. 1969. 70*s*.)

The Indian Muslim poet Mīrzā Asadullāh Khān Ghālib, the centenary of whose death was celebrated last year in both India and Europe, had until this time received little notice outside his own subcontinent. To many in the West therefore it came as something of a surprise when lavish arrangements were made to remember him by the holding of international congresses and the publication of books and articles. We now have, thanks to the collaboration of a British and an Indian Muslim scholar, what may well be the definitive English work on this poet for some time to come.

Ghalib's interests were wide even for a writer of his day and age. He was primarily a poet, it is true, writing in Urdu as well as Persian (though he does not seem to have thought very highly of the former language — an irony of history, since it was largely owing to his pioneering work that Urdu developed into an important literary language). But he also wrote on many other subjects ranging from history to linguistics. His *Qāṭe' i Burhān*, a criticism of the seventeenth-century lexicographical work *Burhān i Qāṭe'*, was vigorously attacked by traditionally-minded critics, and the ensuing slanging match (for Ghalib was a master of the language of controversy when he wished to be) ended in a law-suit from which Ghalib ultimately withdrew with his wrongs unrighted. We learn some-

thing of this affair in the present book, though not as much as we should like.

The principal source for the details of Ghalib's life is his voluminous correspondence with his friends, mostly in Urdu, which he started in the early eighteen-fifties and continued up to his death. Probably no historical character has ever been so intimately revealed for the benefit of posterity, for Ghalib was a fluent, even garrulous, letter-writer, whose thoughts seemed to flow on to paper in an uninterrupted stream. As we know from other sources, he was something of a reprobate in his private life, and in his letters (many of them first published during his lifetime and with his encouragement) he makes no secret of his wine-drinking and other peccadilloes. He had more than his share of troubles, personal and domestic, to say nothing of the catastrophe of the Indian Mutiny, which destroyed the royal house on which he had largely depended for his livelihood. It is scarcely surprising therefore that there frequently enters into his writing a note of complaint and even despair. But on the whole we find a portrait of a good-natured, easy-going, friendly man, often quick-tempered and liable to take offence, but equally ready, if the right overture was made, to forgive and forget.

Perhaps the only weakness of this book is that, in allowing Ghalib to speak for himself through his letters, it has tended to concentrate excessively on the trivia of Ghalib's life. While there are frequent passing references to his literary activities, there is little to justify his great literary reputation. In extenuation it must be pointed out that the authors promise a second volume dealing critically with his poetry; but his prose writings are also of considerable interest, and it seems that of these only *Dastambū,* his eye-witness account of the Indian Mutiny in Delhi, is to be treated in any detail (there is a translation of substantial passages on pp. 133–48 and in the following chapter). His vivid prose style makes one avid for more. It is a pity too that the authors should have decided (p. 11) to exclude all discussion of his ideas on lexicography and linguistics, which were interesting and expressed in vigorous and controversial style.

L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON

In Search of the Miraculous: Fragments of an Unknown Teaching. By P. D. OUSPENSKY. (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. 399 pp. 1969. Paperback, £1 5*s.*, i.e. £1.25)

As this paperback is the sixth impression since 1950, it indicates the continuing interest in the movement it describes, centring on the highly controversial figure of Gurdjieff. Here Ouspensky describes his intellectual odyssey, the ideas reported from Gurdjieff's conversations and meetings, from the time of their first encounter to Ouspensky's final recognition that Gurdjieff was leading "towards the way of religion, of the monastery, and required the observance of all religious forms and ceremonies," and that this was not his own way.

Though the teaching's presentation has here no organized plan, the book gives plenty enough by which to judge its scope and tone. Comparison of its contradictions with the Theosophical esoteric philosophy, presented some decades earlier, is interesting. Incidentally Gurdjieff claimed his teaching had no definite aim, but only showed each man how to attain [occultly] whatever aim he had. H. P. Blavatsky wrote: "The Ethics of Theosophy are even more necessary to mankind than the scientific aspects of the psychic facts of nature and man."

Yet however enigmatic the teacher's character, however problematic the nature of the teaching and its methods, in its inward-turning direction, its unfamiliar psychological and scientifically-expressed concepts, the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky movement has been one of the factors in battering and breaking the old rigid orthodox moulds of thought, a process that has been increasingly active since the end of the last century.

And in this historical aspect, perhaps, as well as in the book's stimulus that makes demands on the reader's discrimination, lies it value.

L. MARR

SPECIAL OFFER TO SANSKRIT STUDENTS

Shri V. B. Nataraja Sastri, Editor of *Śrīnarasiṁhavijayacampū* (reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, March 1970, p. 142), has offered copies of this work free to Sanskrit scholars and interested students of Sanskrit. Those who would like to receive a copy by post are requested to write to him, forwarding only the costs of packing and postage, Re. 1·50, at Ayurvedacharya Atreyashrama, 28 Tennur Road, Tiruchirapalli 17, Madras State.

Ends and Sayings

" . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

This is European Conservation Year, and the Council of Europe has planned national and international conferences and activities throughout the year to work out means of protecting and preserving the environment from an industrialism run mad in its blind drive for productivity and profit. For example, the Rhine, shared by Switzerland, France, Germany, and Holland, indicates most dramatically the appalling river conditions found everywhere. Its pollution-content from industrial effluents, already 10–15 units per cubic metre at Basle, has risen, by the time it reaches the North Sea, to 1,500,000 units per cubic metre. Twenty-four nations took part in the January 1970 conference at Strasbourg to survey the problem as a whole and to benefit by sharing experiences about methods of coping with different aspects of it.

In the United States President Nixon has launched, with financial support, a five-year research programme covering water and air pollutions and disposal of solid wastes, as well as the problem of public recreation areas and parks and the irresponsible jettisoning of litter over the countryside, and, finally, ways and means of achieving better standards. Industrial effluents are the worst offenders as regards water pollutions, while the motor car takes first place in air pollution.

In Britain, "pollution" and "ecology," despite some danger of becoming political catchwords, are stimulating action. The Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, has suggested that industry must bear the cost of cleaning up its own wastes, and not loose them to public harm. Some firms claim that the cost of pollution control would put them out of business. Yet, as Jeremy Bugler points out in a survey of the Irwell river pollutions in manufacturing Lancashire, industry "has no choice. If it doesn't clean up, it will have a blighted Britain and a bad place to do business in." (*The Observer,* 1 February 1970).

Other aspects of environmental damage, such as deforestation, are also causing alarm in the Soviet Union, still suffering from dust-bowl conditions due to ploughing up virgin lands. But a still more hazardous plan of interference with the environment is being studied in the United States and Russia. John Davy ("Science and Survival,"

Span, February 1970) cites the warning given by a hydrological expert, Dr. Raymond L. Nace, to a UNESCO conference at Paris about the schemes to divert whole river systems in these countries from the colder and less inhabited north to the warmer southern regions. Dr. Nace states this would not only change the temperature balance with unforeseeable effects, but even runs the risk of affecting the rotation of the earth, which might be slowed down and caused to wobble on its axis, by the transfer of huge masses of water from the Poles to the Equator.

Old traditions are full of tales of the perennial fight between good and evil. Generally this is thought of in terms of religion and social morals. Yet surely this conflict between so-called "progress" and "conservation" is simply another aspect of the age-long war. Perhaps it may be described as between a giant ego-centredness, using a one-eyed technology, with its lack of vision in depth, and minds whose balanced sight perceives humbly in some measure the wholeness of nature and man.

"The riddle of wholeness." This is a vital philosophical question taken up also by John Davy ("Science and Survival," *Span,* February 1970). He refers to the ideal of a dynamic, regenerative "balance and harmony between man and the living environment," and considers the nature of this in relation to the findings at a series of scientific conferences, at the Villa Serbelloni on Lake Como. The recurring question was the biological theory underlying the "wholeness" of living organisms. A vast amount of research has brought knowledge about their parts, but, just as no amount of investigation of the separate parts of a watch will explain why and for what reason they are assembled together, so scientists' attempts to reduce to a mere matter of chemistry and physics all the numerous hierarchical functions of the living components of organisms, are, apart from practical difficulties, possibly misleading in principle.

> ... the hierarchical structure of organisms means that the "parts" at each one level — say the cells in an organ — can only be fully explained by referring to the functioning of the next higher level of the hierarchy (instead of the next lower level, as is attempted in "molecular biology"). Thus each cell somehow "knows its place" in an organ, which in its turn knows its place in the whole organism. How this order is created and maintained remains a very great mystery.

The failure to synthesize partial knowledge is at the root of many unsolved ecological problems, but Mr. Davy considers that this hierarchical aspect of the living world points the way to practical understanding of them.

Mr. Davy once wrote most fascinatingly of the new astronomical world-picture being created through modern research, calling it "a curious new twentieth-century astrology" (*The Observer,* 1 October 1967). "Ends and Sayings" comment then (THE ARYAN PATH, December 1967) was:

> Dare one suggest that, one day, we may return also to the ancient world-picture of hierarchies of intelligences, of the *Anima Mundi,* the Universal World-Soul that links all being?

To this we might now add two other statements from ancient thought:

> The whole Kosmos is guided, controlled, and animated by almost endless series of Hierarchies of sentient Beings ... the agents of Karmic and Cosmic Laws. They vary infinitely in their respective degrees of consciousness and intelligence. ...
>
> —H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine,* I. 274-5

> They are the Intelligent Forces that give to and enact in Nature her "laws," while themselves acting according to laws imposed upon them in a similar manner by still higher Powers ... This hierarchy of spiritual Beings, through which the Universal Mind comes into action, is like an army — a "Host," truly — by means of which the fighting power of a nation manifests itself, and which is composed of army corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, and so forth, each with its separate individuality or life, and its limited freedom of action and limited responsibility; each

contained in a larger individuality, to which its own interests are subservient, and each containing lesser individualities in itself.

—*Ibid.*, I. 38

It takes real knowledge to present, simply and accurately, the facts from many widespread fields in only four comparatively short talks, as Mr. Gerald Whitrow, Reader in Mathematics, Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, has done so admirably in his B.B.C. "Discussions on the Nature of Time." Even when his presentation may not call out full agreement, it is always thought-provoking.

Nearly all older civilizations thought of time as cyclic, with a periodic recurrence of events (though one regrets that his interesting illustrations from ancient nations did not include the Hindu). With Christianity's emphasis on the Crucifixion as a unique event in time, the concept of linear time developed, with an interplay between the two ideas up to the seventeenth century, the age of scientific revolution, when the invention of the mechanical clock encouraged both the mechanistic conception of nature and the "continuous line" time-image, which dominated the succeeding centuries. The various philosophic definitions are briefly sketched — time as subjective perception, as sensation associated with attention, as a specific sense, as understandable only through memory (itself a mystery). Long-term memories do not depend on localized brain traces, but survive cortical excisions, severe electrical shocks, even the electrical inactivity of animal hibernation.

Time is not a simple sensation but depends on processes of mental organization uniting thought and action. ... The concept of self is based on our recollection of experiences in objective time that have been organized by the mind into some kind of conceptual structure.

Our time sense, he suggests, probably depends on the various biological clocks in the organisms of man, animals, and plants alike, and this points to a new approach to biological research.

We cannot explain the living organism simply in terms of those physical and chemical concepts suggested by examining it only when dissected.

The concepts of mathematical time, duration, finite and infinite time, the relational theory of time (as derived from events) are all surveyed. But surely it is a false premise that cyclic time implies a closed circle, with repetitions nonsensically identical with the original cycle, not separate continuations? Does not the concept of the spiral retain the cyclic character — a return to the original point — while conveying additionally the idea of progression?

Mr. Whitrow carries the history of the ever-increasing refinements in precision time-measurements down to 1967, when the discovery of pulsar stars enabled radio-astronomers to check the synchronicity of astronomical time with that of terrestrial atomic clocks. From Einstein's relativity theory, he turns back to the Greek philosophers' view of time as associated with the ever-moving universe, not with ultimate reality. He assesses the concepts of "space-time," the "block universe," and the distinction between space and time, in that time is irreversible and past, present, and future only characterize the order in which we experience events. He touches only briefly on extra-sensory perception and precognition, but one must blame any gaps in the argument on the limited knowledge today of this subject.

His conclusion is that physical time is the objective factor on which depends our perception of time, conditioned by subjective and sociological factors. Time cannot be reduced to anything else, being a basic feature of the universe; yet it cannot be said to exist in its own right. It is essentially transitional.

It may be appropriate here to cite the Eastern view:

Everything that *is*, *was*, and *will be*, eternally IS, even the countless forms, which

are finite and perishable only in their objective, not in their *ideal* Form. They existed as Ideas, in the Eternity, and when they pass away, will exist as reflections.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 282

Time is only an illusion produced by the succession of our states of consciousness as we travel through eternal duration, and it does not exist where no consciousness exists in which the illusion can be produced; but "lies asleep." The present is only a mathematical line which divides that part of eternal duration which we call the future, from that part which we call the past. Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change — or the same — for the billionth part of a second; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of "time" known as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories we name past. ... The real person or thing does not consist solely of what is seen at any particular moment, but is composed of the sum of all its various and changing conditions from its appearance in the material form to its disappearance from the earth. It is these "sum-totals" that exist from eternity in the "future," and pass by degrees through matter, to exist for eternity in the "past."

—*Ibid.*, I. 37

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

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